Johnso29
I agree there were several startling findings--poor airmanship; poor training including failures to correct prior poor performance; and the entire issue of "outsourced" flying which is scarcely being touched. When the public buys a ticket, they expect to be flying on that airline's flights; with the standards set by that airline and that airline standing behind their operation. Here was a case where none of those public expectations were met.
However, one the Board's recommendations, based on their findings, was:
Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to address fatigue risks associated with commuting, including identifying pilots who commute, establishing policy and guidance to mitigate fatigue risks for commuting pilots, using scheduling practices to minimize opportunities for fatigue in commuting pilots, and developing or identifying rest facilities for commuting pilots. (A-10-16)
The recommendation lays the burden of managing commuting crew's fatigue management on both the crew and the company. None of which is addressed in the new regulation. As was posted here, in the future, an airline that could know what the commuting status of a crew member; that is, had access to the times of travel, hotel/crash pad entry, and doesn't act to prevent abuses will be in a world of hurt in the event of another accident where fatigue was cited. Especially with a Board member who has been a noted NASA fatigue expert.
GF