in 2003, AA employees accepted $1.8 billion in annual wage and benefit givebacks and the elimination of 9,300 jobs.

As Horton is the first to point out, AA is not the typical bankrupt airline, in terms of both short-term financial stability (unprecedented for a bankrupt US carrier) and having several unique “assets” that Horton believes provide a foundation for long-term prosperity.

For starters, AMR has approximately $4.1 billion in unrestricted cash and short-term investments available, a very high amount for a bankrupt company in general and an unheard of amount for a US airline operating under Chapter 11. Coupled with revenue from continuing operations (more than $6 billion per quarter), the cash “is anticipated to be more than sufficient to assure that [AA’s] vendors, suppliers and other business partners will be paid timely and in full for goods and services,” the airline stated. “Because of the company’s current cash position, the need for debtor-in-possession financing is neither considered necessary nor anticipated.”

In other words, filing for Chapter 11 was a carefully plotted strategic decision, not a desperate play for survival. AA views the process as a way to get its cost base more in line with competitors that have already utilized bankruptcy reorganization to lower their debts and expenses (especially labor costs), not as a means of avoiding imminent collapse—or anything close. (The company probably could have carried on outside of bankruptcy for some time, albeit while likely continuing to incur big losses.) Passengers, partners and vendors shouldn’t worry that the company won’t be able to meet its obligations, AA has assured, eliminating what would be a serious concern in most bankruptcy cases.