Editorial Chapter 11: The stick when unions refuse the carrot | ATWOnline
Chapter 11: The stick when unions refuse the carrot
By
Karen Walker
Gerard Arpey famously once said while he was American Airlines chairman and CEO that he was “looking under every rock” to find the savings necessary to keep the company from having to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
In the end, the rock-searching quest failed. For many observers, AMR Corp.’s fall into Chapter 11 was no surprise. The company has lost more than $11 billion since 2001 and has seen its rivals merge into mega-carriers that outsize and outcompete American.
But there was one rock that was most obstinate of all and which ultimately forced Arpey’s hand, making him deal the Chapter 11 hand even though he refused to play this game (Arpey was asked by the AMR board to remain as chairman and CEO, but chose to resign, reportedly stepping down without any severance).
AMR’s labor groups were the immovable obstacles. And it was not only about money; unrealistic work practice rules were a particular sticking point. American said that its labor costs were $800 million a year higher than its rivals, mainly because its pilots operate under less flexible, fewer-hour contracts.
It must be pointed out that US legacy airline management—including American’s —is partly to blame for this situation. Back in the heyday 1990s when business was booming, US airlines did generous deals with their unions which now seem, albeit with hindsight, recklessly neglectful of the need to prepare for harder times. Management failure to strike tough but fair bargaining agreements created a double-headed problem. First, these high labor costs were unsustainable in the post 9/11 era—and even without 9/11, they could not compete with the new and growing wave of low-cost carriers. And second, they fueled a misperception by unionized employees that every new contract would improve on the last one, while also securing jobs for all.
Nevertheless, AMR’s union leaders must be held to task for not seeing the stick that was most assuredly coming in the form of Chapter 11 if they refused the carrots that Arpey and his team spent years attempting to make palatable. Given the evidence all around them—every other US legacy carrier has resorted to Chapter 11 at some point and American is bleeding money in a weak economy that may worsen before it turns around—then it was foolhardy to think the AMR board would not follow the same path.
The failure of legacy carrier labor groups to wake up to the new economic reality is not unique to the US. Witness the ultimate showdown that Qantas CEO Alan Joyce eventually had with his airline’s unions in October when he ground the fleet to force to a head a long and costly dispute.
For American, Chapter 11 is neither as dramatic a step nor is it as traumatic for customers. But that does not mean it will be easy. CEO Tom Horton has warned of a tough, unpredictable path ahead that will result in unpopular decisions and, of course, job cuts. Management now has much less control of where it slices and dices; and union leaders have done neither their company nor the employees they represent any favors by their stubbornness.