And what you would say is still wrong.

In your haste to post data to support your view, you failed to comprehend what Mr. Voss actually said. It's there in the title, the first three words:

Pilots back up ...

You failed to understand what it means to back up the automation, even when Mr. Voss offered a poignant example of pilots' failure to do just that. "Back up" does not mean "watch." "Back up" means knowing enough about flying airplanes to recognize when the automation isn't doing what you want it to do, and having the skills to actually fly the airplane with your own two hands when the automation isn't working.

The Air France 447 pilots failed on both scores. They failed to recognize it wasn't doing what it was supposed to do, and they failed miserably at using their 2 hands to fly the airplane.

The failure in training has been to place so much emphasis on the skills required to use the automation that the skills required to fly airplanes, like pilots do, has suffered. Mr. Voss is correct -- we need to change our emphasis on training so that we are able to back up the automation -- that means Fly the Airplane FIRST, LAST, and ALWAYS.

Do you disagree with my analysis? Read this sentence from Mr. Voss and explain how it fits your model of "pilots just manage the computer."That pitch/power stuff right there is what they call pilot sh... stuff.


Do yourself a favor and watch the video Hacker15e posted. It will be the best 25:32 you've spent all month. Here's a YouTube version of the same thing:

"Children of Magenta"

The real title of the presentation is "Automation Dependency", but he introduced a term which has stuck -- Children of the Magenta. It's actually an edited version of a portion of a course presented at the American Airlines Flight Academy in 1997. It is just as valid today, if not more so.

Here are a few highlights:

(Speaking of recent accident history analysis) "Automation dependent pilots allowed their airplanes to get much closer to the edge of the envelope than they should have."

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"Which is the appropriate level [of automation] for the task at hand? ... You could say all this automation was put in our 2-man airplanes to reduce the workload on the 2-man crew, that's why it's in there. And you could say that to go up a level of automation will reduce workload, and that would be true in many scenarios. ... You can also say, however, that going down a level in automation will reduce workload in certain scenarios."

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"We have become what I call 'Children of the Magenta'."

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"We've determined that we have to change the culture that drives us to attempt to operate at the highest levels [of automation] at all times. We created this culture, I mean the whole industry has created this culture, and it needs to be changed."


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"The 'pilot flying' should remain as one with the aircraft in any low altitude maneuvering with the autopilot engaged. ... 'Be the ball'"

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"When we're down there in the pattern, we're maneuvering, we're changing configurations, we've got power settings going back and forth, the pilot flying, even though the autopilot is on, has got to remain tactilely connected to this plane, and mentally flying it, so that he will quickly recognize any deviation from acceptable performance parameters for intended flight path."

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Pay particularly close attention to the Bucharest Autothrottle accident cited. (Tarom Flt 371)

"If the copilot had just had his hand on the throttles ... 128 people would still be alive today."

[I believe the correct number of fatalities is 60.]

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"The autopilot and autothrottles have limitations that affect perfromance."

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"Autopilot and autothrottles, however good, cannot recover the aircraft from a critical flight attitude."

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"A pilot with the controls and the throttles in his hand will do what it takes not to hit a plane he can see, I promise."

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"An autopilot does not understand the command, 'NOW'."

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"Fly the plane first! Fly the plane first!"

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"About 15 years ago we started to become more and more automated in our cockpits, and as the level of automation increased, more and more we started talking about pushing buttons up here ... and we're typing on the typewriters down here to make the airplane flight path adjust, because we were being told by the industry that we were to become 'Automation Managers.' But the accident history of the first six years of the nineties clearly shows Automation Managers plugging themselves into the ground all over this planet.

"We are not Automation Managers. We are Captains and pilots. And by our aviator skills we are to ensure the vertical and lateral paths of these planes at all times. We will use the wonderful tools of automation that have been provided to us to help us with that task. But when the automation is not maintaining the intended flight path, we will turn it off and MAINTAIN THE PATH by our skills."

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"Automation lacks the ability to create flexible responses to unanticipated changes to flight path requirements."

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And THAT'S the truth.




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