Contract 2000 was sold as a vast improvement to Delta Air Lines scope. It imposed block hour limits, ratios (production balances) of flying with DCI, mandatory downsizing of DCI, stage length restriction, aircraft size restrictions, route restrictions, and restrictions on DCI flying for other airlines (like Republic, SkyWest and GoJets do)

What follows will try to copy ALPA's air safety protocols. We will work together to evaluate what was the purpose of the design, if it worked as intended, if it failed, why it failed and how to prevent failure in the future.

Since "production balance" with DCI is a common theme which has been brought back to the discussion by our MEC Chair and in other official communications, let us begin our evaluation there.

Production Balances are a numbers game. Lets grab the Flight Data Recorder and compare the numbers to the specifications as engineered in Contract 2000. Below, the first column is the benchmark ratified in Contract 2000. The next column is the actual number later conceded by ALPA and the third column is the time stamp and source document.

Year - Contract 2000 / Concession / Concession Date & Contractual Reference
2001 - baseline DCI was < 34%
2002 - 34% / 44 to 48% / Reset Agreement - LOA 29
2003 - 36% / 44 to 48% / see above
2004 - 37% / 50% / Restructuring Agreement - LOA 46
2005 - 37% / Removed

What is interesting to note is that when Contract 2000 was ratified a large number of Regional Jets had already been ordered (over 500). There was a minimum 18 month lead time on major sub-components. To accommodate this kind of DCI growth the mainline fleet would have had to have grown from a 2001 total of just over 600 mainline jets to nearly 1,400, which with a RJ fleet nearing 700 would have made Delta and it's two DCI subsidiaries the operator of around 2,100 airplanes. Or in other words, from the onset Contract 2000 relied on Delta growing to approximately the size of Delta, Northwest, American and Alaska combined*, by 2005. It was pure economic nonsense. Contract 2000 scope was doomed from the beginning. ALPA had not done its homework. Every RJ ordered or optioned arrived on schedule. Scope limits were renegotiated in the nick of time, every time. The failure began almost immediately.

• Did the system perform as it was engineered to perform - NO
• Did the system protect the pilots it was designed to protect - NO, they were furloughed
• What failed - While there were multiple component failures, this investigation was narrowly tasked with the "production balance" mechanism as employed in Contract 2000
• Do other contracts / systems rely on this component - YES
• Is this an immediate safety of flight item - YES
• Recommendations - It was observed that as the mainline job protection mechanism's failed, opportunistic structures were rapidly employed to fill the breach. While their redundancy adds weight to the design it is clear these structures were capable of carrying the load, even under the extreme stress of bankruptcy. Consolidation of these structures would provide the needed assurances of safety while alleviating the penalties of redundant structural components and overhead.

* Circa Q1 2012