You guys are both absolutely right here, it would be practically impossible to determine a fiscal, or otherwise, direct penalty against the company in the event that ratios are not honored to the extent outlined in the TA.

Slow, you were referencing a refusal to work overtime from the pilot group, as allowed per the PWA, at the time. The total revenue loss as a result of the cancelled flights is easy to quantify. Quantify the direct loss then settle on an agreed upon fiscal penalty somewhere in the middle.

Tom, attempting to quantify non-compliance with scope provisions is practically an impossibility. Rather such non-compliances are then absorbed, i.e. forgiven, into a new agreement. Attempting to determine the penality after a scope non-compliance issue would be even more difficult, and time would not be in our facor.
It is for that exact reason we should have a predetermined penalty agreed upon before contract signing to protect the interest of the pilot group.

The absence of that backstop, or incentive, to keep the flying balance as outlined would prevent a "pump and dump" scenario.

Furthermore, I can see the term fleet being to loosely manipulated to tip the numbers in the company's favor.
For example, the new 737's we are going to be receiving from Boeing next year will be delivered in the ER configuration, thus allowing to reach some destinations in Europe. Would that then declassify the 737 as domestic narrow body fleet, or would the ratios look more at routes?
If we are focusing more on aircraft fleets, as opposed to mainline routes, we may be looking at different interpretations of what is considered compliance/non-compliance.

I'd like more protections and guarantees that mainline flying would be protected. If an agreement of penalties of non-compliance are agreed upon, then I believe those stipulations may pacify some of the pilot grops concerns.