From LEC 66:
PQC: How do you know this is the best we could get? We can get more if we simply go back to the table.
R: Delta management has two paths. We’ll call them paths “A” and “B.” Path A includes shifting a great deal of capacity from DCI to mainline. We have been begging them to do so for years. We prefer (but are not married to) path A. Path B is to more slowly park the 50-seat jets as soon as their contracts allow, hence a much slower drawdown of DCI capacity and, therefore, a much slower corresponding increase of mainline-capacity growth.
Plan A and plan B both represent financial implications to management. They would prefer plan A because they believe it will make Delta more profitable. The trick, and the fleeting opportunity that we had, was to extract the most value possible for the Delta pilots for plan A. The rub? That number is finite. At some point, plan A becomes more expensive than plan B, and management (because they are not stupid) will almost certainly choose the less expensive option. At that point, we believe that we will lose the opportunity to extract financial gains from something that also benefits us—the shifting of capacity (jobs) from DCI to mainline.
We were recently briefed by Linda Pachula, the head of the National Mediation Board. During her brief, she discussed common mistakes that she has seen unions make. Most common was: “They didn’t listen to their experts.” We have experts working for us. Despite allegations to the contrary, we have professional negotiators—lawyers who collectively have assisted in more aviation labor negotiations for more years than perhaps anyone else in the country. We have financial analysts, accountants, and subject-matter experts on every section of the contract. And we have our Negotiating Committee, men the entire MEC trusted enough to unanimously reelect. They studied the plans and financials extensively. They negotiated fiercely (the idea from some that they just accepted management’s first offer is simply laughable). They extracted significant value. And they firmly believe two things: 1) we got every penny of value we could at this time, and 2) if we reject this deal, the company will revert to plan B and pursue traditional (and usually lengthy) Section 6 negotiations.
This is what the experts we hired told us. They saw the books and were in the room. And we trust them. The people who assert that we could do better if we send this back are basing that opinion on a hunch or a hope. We chose not to risk hundreds of millions of dollars for the Delta pilots on a hunch. We chose to heed the lessons of other unions’ failures. We chose to listen to our experts.