A situation to ponder while considering this high/low flight time debate:

Captain: 3500-4000 hours, 1500+ in type; 1st month holding a line after 6+ on reserve
FO (me): 2500, 300 in type; 1st month holding line after 6 on reserve, former corporate part 91, flight instructor, and 4 month stint another 121 carrier

Trip details:
Captain: 4th leg (and final) of day 3 out of a 6 day trip (actually a 2 and a 4 day back to back)
FO: 1st leg of day 1 of a 4 day trip

Weather:
Night, Approx 2130
From 30 mins out to 10 mins out visibility dropped from 1 SM to 1/4 SM
Constant report of Vertical Vis 400', wind 270@12, Snow, Fog, Braking Action Good
IMC with Continuous St. Elmo's fire from 6000' down to about 2000', IMC continues to Minimums

Event:
Captain is PF
FO is PNF
Vectors to ILS Rwy 18
Runway hasn't been plowed since storm started 1.5 hrs prior
RVR reported at 1800, 2000, 1600, 2200, 2600, 2200, then 3000 all within about 4 minutes
FO calls "approach lights in sight" at 350 AGL
CA calls "continuing"
FO calls "runway in sight" at 200 AGL
CA calls "landing" and disengages the autopilot
Aircraft immediately starts going below glideslope
FO calls "glideslope"
CA calls "correcting"
Automated voice: SINK RATE, SINK RATE
CA calls "correcting"
FO notices pitch attitude is still unusually low
Automated voice: (very rapidly) 50,40,30,20,10
FO simultaneously states "get the nose up" and pulls the yoke aft to attain a normal pitch attitude
Aircraft touches down in a normal attitude without incident

Factors:
CA Fatigue
Weather
Difficulty visually adjusting from instruments to visual flight (Captain hadn't experienced this difficulty before, FO had)
Destabilization of approach after disengaging autopilot
First time Captain had shot an approach in conditions this extreme (conditions can get even worse!)


Things to do differently:
Leave autopilot engaged as long as possible to allow for adequate transition to visual flight
Hold and request runway to be plowed
Go missed when approach became unstable
I should have offered to fly the leg since I was just starting the trip and the Captain was at the end of a long day

I have my opinions regarding this low time debate. I prefer not to get into it. I just felt the best thing I could do would be to post an experience of mine and leave it up to others to consider the following:

Would a low time (you define low time) pilot have intervened as I did?
Would a pilot fresh off their first Part 121 Initial Operating Experience (regardless of prior experience) have intervened as I did?
Is it really the best idea to think "THE CAPTAIN IS THE FINAL AUTHORITY" and will take over if things go bad? The FIRST OFFICER had to take over in this case.

I feel there are elements of my prior flight experience that caused me to instinctively intervene as I did. Extensive flight instruction in IMC and single pilot IFR (personal time building and corporate) are at the top of my list.

Flight instructing (and self preservation) developed the instinct to take over as I did. I minimized the use of simulators and "view limiting" devices when I earned my IFR ticket and hunted for IMC as I built time. I also minimized the use of simulators and "view limiting devices" when I trained students. Doing so allowed me to experience the transition from IMC to VMC numerous times as both PF and PNF. I emphasized this critical phase of flight to students.

I know there are many of you out there with similar/other valuable backgrounds. I encourage you all to share challenging experiences, such as mine, and what helped you to handle the situation. Hopefully, we can encourage others to follow in our foot steps (traditional career building instead of pay for training) without talking down to them. Provide the facts, encourage unbiased thinking by providing unbiased key points to consider, and allow others to decide.

We aren't going to change this industry by bashing one another. We need to promote safe (not "adequate") standards and educate those considering a career in aviation. Promote quality, not quantity.