Candidly, Congressman,” Mr. Smisek concluded, “we are eking out a hand-to-mouth existence.” See C-Span Video Clip, Smisek to Congress, at
Smisek to Congress - C-SPAN Video Library (beginning at 0:34). And for Continental, after the Delta-Northwest merger, it had to have a merger with United; there was no other option. See Darren Shannon, United Continental CEO is Person of the Year, Aviation Week, December.
Had United not merged with Continental, United was positioned to pursue its discussions with US Airways, the fear Mr. Smisek candidly acknowledged, creating an alternative powerhouse and leaving Continental on the sidelines and in deep trouble.
The UAL Committee intends to present a balanced picture of the two pre-merger airlines – United Air Lines (“UAL”) and Continental Airlines (“CAL”) – warts and all, in the context of the intensely competitive and cyclical airline industry environment in which each found itself when they announced their merger in 2010. Each had its strengths and weaknesses and we will not shy away from addressing both, as well as the dramatic effect on the industry – and the likely fortunes of these two airlines – of the game- changing merger between Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines in 2008.
Take the two arguments to an outside intelligent source and then post here which argument is more cogent and unbiased.
For once in many years I am proud of my ALPA representatives for their work, regardless of the outcome. The CAL willingness to ignore the majority of ALPA merger policy and failure to discuss the opposing views is unfortunate.
Continental and United were headed in different directions financially when they announced their merger at the end of one of the most difficult decades in the history of the airline industry. Continental earned more than $1.0 billion in operating income from January 2000 through September 2010, while United lost $7.8 billion.
Continental’s performance shines a light on one facet of the financial solidity that it has maintained, largely through shifting capacity to more lucrative international markets ahead of the industry. Continental flew a greater percentage of its block hours internationally at the time of the merger than United or any other U.S. airline. These facts illustrate the reality that the Continental pilots had better career expectations than their United counterparts in 2010, and in the decade leading up to the merger. Unlike the United pilots, the Continental pilots flew for a financially stable airline.
And, there Mr. Arbitrator is the argument. So what say you . . .