All this bickering.
How about an out of the box solution that protects what each side brought to the merger? The CAL guys like what they brought as do the UAL guys.
-Movement up the seniority depends on who retires.
Prior to each new equipment bid, it is calculated how many LCAL and LUAL retirees there have been. For example: First bid since ISL is 3 months later and 50 CAL retire and O LUAL retire then all LCAL pilots move up 50 numbers and LUAL pilots stay the same. The opposite could be true. Anything ratio in between is calculated as such.
Sure, the list changes over time but each side protects their retirement numbers. Computers and algorithms can make simple work of this...even a monthly basis.
-Protect the flying you expected: Ratio the aircraft bid movement relative to what each side brought to the table. Using simple numbers, e.g.CAL has twice the 737's as UA has A320's. For every NB 737/320 CAP bid, there would be 2 CAL awards for every UAL award. Likewise, since UAL had 3x the 777's, then 3 UAL bids (CAP or FO) for every CAL bid. 747's, (A350) I suppose would have to be fenced off permanently. Each fleet could be calculated in a similar manner.
-Protect bases: Each group had pre merger expectations of their companies bases and no other. If you wanted to move to the other sides legacy base, it would be allowed only if it went unfilled from that legacy carrier. In addition, since seniority for bidding in base is KEY to QWL, if said pilot was awarded that foreign base then he/she would have to bid at the bottom just like the present day hardship rule. Reasonable since the pilot had zero expectation to ever fly out of that base.
The gamble is where new airplanes go or if certain bases grow or decline. If the company sends more aircraft to one sides bases then the other, I suppose that would be a testament on whose network was more economically viable and valuable. Reading all these posts about what each side brought to the merger, I'm sure each group would be willing to stand behind their original network.