This is not normally my week to write a brief. However, there are a couple of topics that I think are time sensitive and since I will be on vacation next week, I thought I would write an update this week instead of next.

As everyone is painfully aware, there has been a tectonic shift in our trip mix, especially on the B-737 and B-756. On the legacy United side of the house, the same is true for the A320 fleet. The question is why. The Company has started to make claims that the sole culprit is the rig package we negotiated as part of the UPA and more specifically, the implementation of the provision requiring the Company to apply proper pay and credit for each day of work. We call this M5D. Their claims might actually sound reasonable until you delve a little deeper into the facts.

To begin with, there is a case at the Company where the left hand does not have a clue what the right hand is doing or can do. There has been an ongoing game of musical aircraft being played without adequately taking into account the differences in metal or the inability to mix crews. There are numerous examples of situations where this has led to network schedule inefficiencies that exacerbate pilot scheduling issues.

In September 2010, there were about 300 segments where neither end was a crew base. In September 2013, there are 4,122 such segments, with 17,435 hours of flying. In these cases, pilots who might have otherwise flown a turn (IAH-SFO-IAH) end up laying over somewhere to fly the non-base segment the next day. Under most conditions, just a few of these segments can upend a schedule, drastically reducing turns and other short trips. Additionally, not only is the trip now a four-day trip or longer, but (through NO fault of the pilots), the Company needs to find a way to close the M5D gap. That is most easily achieved by tacking a moderate to long turn on to one end of the trip.

Perhaps most importantly, the trip mix is primarily impacted by the Company’s failure to properly staff the L-CAL side of the house. EWR, DEN and ORD are understaffed, while IAH is overstaffed. As flying is pushed into the IAH bases, it means that more and more IAH trips will be four days. This effect is especially pronounced in SFO and IAD, where bases have been needed. Management has failed to or delayed the opening of those bases, so crews from other bases have to cover those trips. Furthermore, the failure of management to properly staff/open bases is evident in another piece of the puzzle – deadhead. Deadhead (DH) was previously a relatively rare event. In September 2013, we have almost 2,500 hours of DH in the domestic B-737 and B-756 solutions alone. The B-787 is a special case, but it had more than 600 hours of DH. Management has squandered approximately 45-50 pilots by having them ride around in the back of airplanes. In other words, they have further exacerbated a short staffing issue.

For illustration, let’s go back to September 2010, a representative pre-merger month. That month in IAH, there were 2,310 pairings, of which 78 were “dogs” (under four hours per day), and 354 that fell somewhere between four and five hours per day. Fewer than 19 percent of the pairings would have qualified for M5D. More importantly, only a very small percentage (three percent or 78 trips) really needed a lot of help. If we apply management’s rationale for the current September 2013 trip mix, this would mean that to get a lot of help for 78 trips and a little help for 354 trips, virtually every trip in the base would have been a four-day trip. Frankly, this just doesn't pass the smell test.

To deny that M5D is having an impact on trip mix would be disingenuous. Certainly it is having an impact. However, the biggest impacts on trip mix, schedule and quality of life, which we have observed for the past two years, are the Company’s unwillingness to put the right metal in the right place, their unwillingness to open crew bases where they are so desperately needed, and the persistent short staffing of the L-CAL side of the airline. To be fair, we have seen large swings in the trip mix at L-CAL before. The only difference now is that instead of limiting credit, and to accommodate understaffing and paying 16 hours for four-day trips, the Company will now be required to apply proper credit and pay a minimum of 20 hours for those four-day trips.

This discussion segues nicely into our understanding that System Bid 14-02A is scheduled to come out today. The preliminary copy I saw showed slightly more than 300 vacancies and the opening of a SFO crew base flying the B-737. The vacancies are the result of unfilled vacancies from the 14-02 bid and other movement needed to allocate pilots around the system. This is by no means a significant growth bid, but it will provide additional options for pilots and is a step in the right direction toward getting pilots into logical places to fly the schedule.

This bid will be governed in part by the provisions of Contract ’02 and the recently agreed upon MOU for the opening of the B-737 SFO base. I encourage you to familiarize yourself with that MOU. (Click HERE for a copy.)

That’s all for today. As always, Fly Safe.

One Union, One Voice