It appears that it is a reissue from an emergency AD from 2012 from a similiar A330 incident. Airbus redesigned the AOA sensor, and when the redesigned sensor was installed, the procedure was removed from the AFM.

ALPA argued that the "Blocked AOA" procedure (one ADR on, other two ADRs off, suggest usage of FPV) be retained for flight crew reference after compliance with the AD, but the FAA did not see the requirement to keep the procedure after the revised AOA sensors were installed and removed the procedure.

So this new AD after it has happened again to a 321 it appears.

EASA Airworthiness Directive 2012-0264-E
EASA Airworthiness Directive 2013-0022
Federal Register, Volume 78 Issue 191 (Wednesday, October 2, 2013)
EASA Airworthiness Directive 2014-0266-E