Originally Posted by
2StgTurbine
You just mentioned two misconceptions common with 3407. Icing had nothing to do with it. That was just the initial thought of the NTSB, and everyone just remembers that. The Q-400 can handle a lot of ice and the tail was specifically designed to prevent tail icing. According to Bombardier, tail icing is impossible (not a very smart thing to say in aviation). Also, the FO raising the flaps was not a major factor. When she say the nose pitch up, I believe she thought the other pilot was executing a go around and sim training took over causing her to raise the flaps. And not recognizing a stall with a shaker going off is probably a sign of fatigue. Also, the point where the flaps are raise, the aircraft is 40 knots below the stall speed, pitching up 15*, and banking 70* as a wing drops. With the other pilot fighting the stick pusher, it did not matter where the flaps were at that point.
My point is that the wrong crew was in the wrong place at the wrong time.
The crew needed to be in a different profession that did not involve the use of complicated equipment.
NTSB Chairwoman Deborah Hersman said it was the pilots' "complacency and confusion that resulted in catastrophe," and more importantly, the safety issues involved in the crash still have not been fixed.
"These are issues that we have seen time and time again, and unfortunately it has taken 50 lives for us to focus additional attention on these issues that have not been addressed," Hersman said.
In the cockpit that night, Capt. Marvin Renslow did not notice that the plane's speed was dropping dangerously low. When cockpit warnings indicated the plane was about to stall, instead of pushing what is called the stick shaker forward to increase speed, Renslow pulled it backwards multiple times. The second in command, First Officer Rebecca Shaw, may not have been experienced enough to respond right away, investigators said.
It all boils down to the training and checking process, or lack thereof.