Glad you asked. Network and revenue management allocate flying. The company's plan for the allocation of flying does not include consideration of scope compliance. Worse, because we have quite long measurement periods followed by cure periods; harm to pilots can accumulate during an extended period of noncompliance before an actual "violation" occurs.

In successive administrations (including this one) our Scope Compliance and Analysis Chairman is not permitted to interface with network management. In fact, the Scope Compliance and Analysis Chairman is not allowed "to advocate for scope" compliance. This has been reiterated as "we do not see the SC&A Chair as an advocacy position."

The improvement I suggest (and which is on the agenda for the May 11th C44 LEC meeting) is that we change the policy manual to include participation in the network meetings in the Scope Compliance & Analysis Chairman's responsibilities, including providing feedback to the company on their scope compliance with the goal of proactively seeking (advocating even) for scope compliance.

Every other functional committee interfaces with their equivalent at the company, working together on scheduling, safety and a host of other tasks which make Delta a better airline. We can improve scope compliance by letting our Scope Compliance and Analysis Chair do their job.

We need support for this resolution. Some feel this is somehow diminishes the power of the MEC Chairman. But in reality the MEC Chairman usually delegates these ministrative tasks. The MEC Chairman still selects (and fires) the Scope Chairman. The Chairman's power to determine who is in the room is not diminished in any way.

My reasoning for cementing this change in the policy manual is that we have to think of the future. John Malone's administration has already adopted some of the suggested improvements. For this work to last it needs to be written policy.