I think the author has done a good job (excellent job with the graphics) but would respectfully suggest a couple of edits:

Overall - this is not the most important part of the changes in Section 1. The redefinition of "Virgin" is potentially more important. 1 E. 9. is more important. This is getting top billing because it is perceived as a "give" ... lets loop back around to that.

Edits on the Con side
(1) Allows Delta and its partnersslightly more ability to flex in trans-Atlantic flying
(2) A small increase in partner flying, or small decrease in our flying will trigger the block hour protection (Should be a PRO)
(3) Global Block Hour floor, if triggered, could protect Pacific and South America flying (PRO)

Add neutral (or PRO) comments:
(1) Limits are very close to current status quo

Now we come to the part everyone is asking, but nobody seems particularly sure of. The problems calculating this in terms of jobs and money is that we are measuring a ratio - which depends on the performance of Delta and 3 other airlines. So, to make an apples to apples comparison, you must first nail down a time window to measure and admit that the data has already changed since your last measure. Scope is a proactive tool, requiring a lot of strategic thought - where are we going?

Strategically, our partners AF/KLM/AZ are in trouble. They have low- cost competitors in the EU and heavily subsidized ME3 predators eating their global network. They have run to the trans-Atlantic market for safety (taking advantage of the market we have created by restraining capacity, fighting flags of convenience and ME3 carriers). Delta has only limited input on what the trans-Atlantic partners do (and sometimes they have had very open disagreements). The variable Delta can't control is partner flying (within a range that is much looser tan our PWA).

So, if we were to assume a static environment based on the measure period from 2012 to 2014 I could show that going from a 48.5% EASK share to 46.5% EASK share lost XX jobs. However, we were not flying 48.5%, we flew ~47.1%. The difference from 47.1% to 48.5% was published (Contract Awareness Bulletin 15-07) as 60 jobs; 20 Captain, 40 FO. BUT the company did not cut staffing during that period (and obviously the amount of partner flying as they ran to the trans-Atlantic and we ran to South America does not change our staffing. Staffing was maintained by International Block Hours).

A DPA Executive Chairman of Hyperbole & SM Exaggeration might extrapolate (actually they don't do math, but play along) that 1.4 to 2.0 is a 42.85% increase and guess 86 pilot jobs could be affected and 28 of those jobs might be Captain positions. These statements can not be made in isolation without knowing:

(1) Current Delta flying
(2) Current partner flying
(3) The effect of the Block Hour Floor

... and even I am having a hard time with the effect of the Block Hour floor. Let me first state - the block hour floor is an excellent downside protection - so good that I am surprised the company agreed to it. Strategically in a global downturn - Air France KLM is slower than Delta at reducing capacity, so the EASK balance will likely go out of compliance first. Then, Asia - Pacific flying is where I see the most vulnerability followed by South American flying. The Global Widebody +757 BH floor would aid us greatly in the region I believe is the most vulnerable.

By my reasoning (with no inside knowlege) is that Delta is very optimistic about Asia flying and the A350. Good for us.

Here is the chart I've asked ALPA, through our Scope Compliance Chairman to generate (what follows is not vetted, I do not even know where it came from, but it looks right)