A little over a year ago I was speaking to an FAA employee (FAA inspector as I recall and he had flown 121 in the past before his FAA gig) and we were discussing the Colgan crash. My take was without talking to the captain is we'll never know what the captain thought he was dealing with. Icing or more specifically tail-plane icing which would have required a completely different response or some other issue entirely. Just no way to know for sure. My .02. (I can't say if he was "established" at this point in the ILS approach maybe someone else can chime in) The FAA inspector's take was that the captain was trying to recover AND not bust his altitude (putting his job at risk) as stall recovery has been about preventing altitude loss and recovering from the stall. In hindsight he and his passengers lost a lot more but he wouldn't be the first in any industry to do something unsafe to try and safeguard employment. Turns out I guessed right when I noticed the change in the PTS standards for stall recovery (amount of allowable altitude loss during recovery) could be traced to this accident. I do know one thing I personally have the lessons learned from this tragedy burned in my mind and I will utilize altitude available to may sure the plane is flying again.