Thanks to everyone for their replies. I obtained most of my information from the Flight Safety Foundation/ Flight Digest/July-August 1996.
This plane only had one ADF and should not have been attempting this landing and I tend to agree with the person who said these pilots probably were pressured by superiors.
It's hard for me to believe that they might have used KLP in reverse sensing with mountains in the area above the MDA. . Using KLP that way, the distance they were off in the end would have only shown up as about 9 degrees on the RMI which isn't a whole lot when you consider all the errors the ADF is subject too.
Yet if they had tuned to CV, it would've shown about 100 degrees clockwise from the nose of the aircraft by the time they hit that mountain. They should've had plenty of warning.
With them wanting to fly a course of 119 degrees and a wind at 4,000 from 160 at 25 kts, they probably would've had to have flown a heading of about 124. That would've put the ADF needle to the left of center and with mountains to the left, they should have never let that needle get right of center, yet in the end, if they were tuned into CV, again, it would've been about 100 degrees right of center.
I said it puzzled me that they found the ADF tuned to KLP. One gentleman explained that when you execute a missed approach, in this case, you would tune back to the previous ADF which was KLP. The accident report said the gear and the flaps were down, but the engines were at a high power level which indicates to me that they just started the procedure for the missed approach, by applying power, but hit the mountain before they could clean up the airplane. Now is it possible that when one pilot was applying power, the other was tuning the ADF back to KLP, before bringing flaps and gear up?
A note here. The report said the warning profile of the GPWS was never penetrated, so the GPWS did not sound any warnings.