November Seven

Have you read the NTSB Report on N950KA? The initial belief was that N950KA flew into IMC with Miami reporting severe radar weather echos and after being cleared up to FL250 then FL260 on a course deviation to 320 degrees from present. N950KA was attempting to get around the weather up to the North of most convective activity. Communications between N950KA and Miami seemed normal (to my reading) for someone trying to avoid bad weather. N950KA continued to climb up to assigned altitudes when given clearance. Everything appeared to be fairly normal.

N950KA was using the AP to make the climb on course (deviation) and had just activated the inertial separator and prop de-ice. While climbing at 109 kts, the AP disengaged at a bank angle of 25 degrees. After AP disengagement, bank angle doubled to 50 degrees in the same direction, to the right. I don't know the pitch angle at this point, but I'm going to assume it was something close to negative.

N950KA then initiates an AP Test, instead of rolling wings level to avoid increasing excessive bank angle. After AP tested "passed," the bank angle had already increased to 75 degrees with significant negative pitch angle well below the horizon. Airspeed had increased to more than 335 kts. That's a rapid increase and differential in airspeed of 226 kts in the time that it took to complete the AP Test.

Apparently, this put N950KA 110 kts over Vo with the nose down and speed probably still increasing along with bank angle to the right. Dropping altitude rapidly, N950KA pulled back on the yoke, shearing both wings. He flew the airplane apart in IMC.

If you read my posts, I specifically state how important it is to me to be prepared for the VLJ before operating it as single pilot in any flight regime. That's what my entire program is all about - getting prepared. The pilot of N950KA, took delivery of his PC-12 about four (4) weeks before this tragedy. Prior to that time, he had not logged a single PIC hour in a Turbo-Prop and he had not flown in IMC for seven (7) full years prior. My approach is completely the opposite of this.

I have studied this incident from the very beginning because an entire Family was lost. Indeed, that is not something I want to happen to me or my Family. There are many reports similar to this one. Unfortunately, this is not the first and it won't be the last. I just want to make certain that such mistakes, errors in judgment, lack of situational awareness and just really poor decision making as a pilot are not things that visit my flying on a regular and routine basis.

This also begs the question: Are FAA Minimum Pilot Requirements Truly Enough?

My goal is to go well above and beyond what the FAA requires. Ironically, your post came right after my questions about Upset Recovery Training and Aerobatics Training as a matter of routine course in my preparation. Would Upset Recovery have helped this pilot? He performed the AP Test and lost recognition of aircraft attitude relative to the horizon. That was the beginning of the nightmare.

What I want to learn how to do is not get into such conditions, but if they do take place - catch it, correct it and get back out in front of the aircraft before I end up with two unsolved problems cascading their way to three, four, five, etc.

Thank you. I am aware of N950KA. It is sobering.