Since I began consistently flying international at FedEx, it's been a rare event that I've felt uncomfortable with the fuel load under the old policy. Supplemental and then Flag ops, including flights with the B043 reserves on the MD-11 followed by the 777, it just wasn't usually an issue.
With the limited experience I've had so far using the new policy not much has changed. We still carry a lot of fuel. Maybe the "business fuel" decision based on the priority of our international freight is driving this. So far, there's always been at least an extra 5K (25-30 min) of RPF and DX fuel "below the line" in addition to required. Within the required, I'm seeing 15-45 min of either hold, contingency or a combination. The biggest surprise is seeing the emergency fuel number drop from a hard 9K to the low 6000s based on the situation. I'd be curious to see what the initial trend is like on the domestic side.
The cynic in me might say that this may trend down as they slowly wean us off our old policy and move closer to their target of 70 minutes FOD. But, I'll reserve judgement for now.
The LMS training we received and the various written communiques sent by management have been pretty consistent. They want to do a better job tailoring the fuel loads and want us to be a part of that process. I really don't have a problem with that.
The JH fleet update that sparked this thread was the first time I have seen someone take a slightly different direction. To quote him directly:
"In other words, the majority of the business reliability planning now resides in the dispatcher obligation arena."
To put his point in a nutshell - Captains (and dispatchers) are now responsible for ensuring the fuel load meets FAR requirements. Beyond that, Captains can suggest additional fuel might be required to help ensure we meet our business obligations by landing at our intended destination on time. However, according to him, that's not safety related. So, if dispatch (with the help of the payload planners) decide the business risk isn't worth the extra fuel cost, they are going to deny the request for more fuel.
Maybe he was just being a little more direct than the rest of the crowd has been during the rollout of this new policy or maybe he went a little off the reservation. Hard to say. But, let's assume for the moment that the examples he used and the points he made in his letter give us a look at what we can expect in terms of the dispatcher-Captain collaboration going forward.
My interpretation of his message is that once we (as Captains or future Captains) determine our flight plan fuel complies with the FARs, that part of our job is done. Actually landing at our intended destination is no longer our responsibility and therefore, since we have the FAR fuel to divert, we are "safe". Asking for more using the "safety card" is not possible, since according to JH, FAR/fuel policy = safe. So, we take the fuel load with which we are provided and make the best and safest effort we can to get to our intended destination.
Obviously when we choose to abandon that effort is 100% our call and that will never change. Maybe now, without the additional fuel requested, some crews might find themselves diverting preemptively before they even poke their nose into the MEM, IND, CDG, or CAN fray if it looks bad enough.
According to JH, taking all possible measures to ensure landing at our intended destination on time is sometimes going to be subservient to fuel savings. That can be a difficult shift in mindset for the typical type-A pilot. I'll be curious to see how this plays out going forward. So far, it's pretty much a non-event on the 777. But, my risk tolerance isn't going to change just because the company may be willing to accept a higher risk that they're going to disappoint their customers more frequently.