Originally Posted by FactsMatter

Facts matter; so here are some:

1. It’s Sieber, not Seiber.

2. SeaPort’s migration to main terminals was a board level decision made in 2014 when the company was not winnjng EAS contracts due to a lack of interline agreements. The only way to offer seamless connections (particularly interline transfer of bags in/out of the secure area) was to be in the main terminals.

3. Regardless, SeaPort’s original business models at the FBOs had been hemorrhaging about $70K a month (in excess of $110K during bad months). Within 6 days of my arrival at SeaPort in July 2011, I pushed to close 5 cities that were responsible for the majority of these losses.

4. In January 2014, I sa xthe handwriting on the wall and begqn advocating a significant reduction in operations. I can’t remember the exact numbers, but the surgical restructuring would have produced something like a 30% fleet reduction, closing 20% of stations, 35% headcount reduction, but allow us to retain over 50% of our EAS revenue and 40% of ticket revenue. It would have painful, but surely less painful than the eventual outcome. I was not afforded the opportunity by prior management to present this plan to the Board and the ship continued head-on into the iceberg.

5. I became president of SeaPort at the end January 2015 and put the company in Chapter 11 less than three weeks later. It was the absolute correct decision. By June 2015, the new management team, supported by the best employees I’ve ever worked with, produced an operating profit. We continued to do so until the day we shut the airline down. Equally important, on-time performance was in the high 90s and we went over 100 days without any cancellations. That wasn’t me, that was the employee team guided by new operational management I installed.

6. We filed a Plan of Reorganization in July 2015. For the first time in it’s history SeaPort had clearly defined business plan. And this was not pie-in-the-sky stuff: It had scrutinized by our mostly new board of directors, creditors committee, US bankruptcy trustee, and the bankruptcy judge. However, both ADI and SeaPort were competing for Beardsley cash. With the return on capital of a reorganized being marginally better than investing in US Treasury bills, Beardsley and I made difficult decision to shutdown SeaPort and his cash be used turnaround ADI. It was the hardest professional decision of my life because it involved letting down a team of employees who had worked so hard and achieved so much in short period of time.

7. On to ADI. I was never an employe of ADI but did act as an advisor to Beardsley. I help to restructure their financial statements to better allow peer comparisons to other operators and evaluating potential revenue streams as a way to flatten wild swings in charter revenue between NCAA basketball and NASCAR. I never advocated abandoning the bread-and-butter charter business. Further, I identified about $100K in monthly savings, but I was an advisor only and not empowered to implement those changes.

8. I helped facilitate the sale of ADI to California Pacific with that deal closing in March 2018. Neither myself or Beardsley have had any involvement since, including the decision to exit the charter business.

But you knew all that. If you wish to discuss further, we have common acquaintances that can easily put you in touch with me. I’ll even pick-up the lunch tab.

Fly safe, happy new year, and good luck with your airline management career.

Respectfully,
Tim Sieber (I before E)