The nature of being a pilot means accepting ultimate responsibility. Mechanical equipment fails; given enough time and cycles, it all fails. Part of our job, our reason for drawing breath on this earth (and a pay check) while in the cockpit, is having accepted ultimate responsibility, to ensure a safe outcome to the flight. Much of the time, mechanical failures amount to little, and we flow a checklist and move on. On occasion, they are momentous, heart-wrenching tests of professional faith, preparation, and a willingness to fly the aircraft to a full stop. Sometimes in between.
A poor carpenter blames his tools.
Both cases of the 737 Max loss involved third world countries and poor choices in which the pilots were NOT flying the airplane, but let it fly them. The subsequent prohibitions on the 737 Max internationally were all political knee-jerk reactions, and with one exception ALL in contravention and violation of the 1944 Chicago convention. This is to say, without basis or foundation
The procedure for stopping unwanted trim has been known, taught and a required memory item for decades in the 737. This is not new.
The principle of following the procedure and not freelancing, also not new.
There is no point in the procedure by Boeing, or in any training program anywhere in the world, which directs the crew to fly past Vmo and impact the ground in excess of 600 knots, or to maintain a high power setting and accelerate away from a trimmed speed.
There is no procedure, once having shut off stab trim, to re-engage it.
There is such a thing as painting one's self into a corner; making a recoverable situation unrecoverable. This happened in both cases.
Presently the FAA has assembled a JATR involving the civil aviation authority of each nation, as well as manufacturer representatives, pilot groups, and investigative interests. Every operator, every nation is included, who wishes to be included, such that the discovery and process is together, to streamline the return to service and eliminate a series of political drama as each nation makes a pretense at recertification.
In the meantime, if pilots cannot accept responsibility for the safe outcome and quit blaming the aircraft, they reveal themselves as incompetent and unworthy, and should remove themselves from the cockpit. It's no place for the spineless who cannot take responsibility for their own action, and who are not prepared to handle not only the normal, but abnormal and emergency conditions which may arise.