The way the timeline is presented, without CVR dialogue, a lot is left open-ended. It will be more interesting to see the timeline set against an actual CVR transcript.

I gather from the short control wheel inputs when the stab trim motors were restored, that the crew was fighting to hold the nose up and was more focused on that than the effects of the trim switch. My impression is that there was some affirmation bias going on; the crew had already tried the electric trim and believed it wasn't working, and perhaps the very short attempt at it again was confirmation of that same bias; the belief that it wasn't working. It lends the impression that the crew gave it a quick try, then devoted all their attention to trying to hold back pressure, while the stab moved toward 0.

There's still insufficient information save for general observation, to get too specific. Some features are obvious at this point, the two most salient being that the crew didn't follow the runaway stab trim procedure, and that the crew accelerated continuously with a high power setting, compounding the problem.

MCAS aside, the AoA failure may have been causing a 4X nose down force intermittently or continuously.

The captain did call for autopilot early, and again when it disconnected; that may be a function of how they train; emergency, engage autopilot. A lot would be clearer with more detailed CVR information, as would the way the checklists were actually called out and executed, as well as the crew's perception and handling.