Originally Posted by
ShyGuy
You say they should have recognized it as stab trim runaway and done the memory item for cutoff switches. Easy to say now, keep in mind they were faced first with a bad AOA sensor, a stick shaker that was on throughout, and false instrument readings. And MCAS runs the trim temporarily and stops, so it doesn’t look like a full on runaway.
Incorrect on all counts. You haven't read the report, have you?
I don't say that the crew should have recognized it. I don't guess. The crew DID recognize it, and did the "memory item for the cutoff switches." Did you not know this?
The crew verbalized it. The crew cut off stab trim. The crew verbalized the failed AoA vane and recognized it.
The crew also restored stab trim when the procedure specifically states that they should not. This procedure is not new: it's been the same for decades.
Stab trim isn't quiet. It's noisy. It's hard to miss; two big wheels, each with a big white stripe in plain sight, next to the thigh. If the autopilot isn't engaged and the pilot isn't trimming and trim is running...fairly obvious that it's uncommanded, and one can either watch it go, or stop it. The crew stopped it, then enabled it again.
Piloting 101: when a problem occurs, keep configuration and speed, especially when the problem gets worse as one changes airspeed. The crew continued to accelerate well outside the performance envelope, and aircraft limitations, as the downward pitching moment continued to increase.
Given that existing Boeing control feel is applied at a force four times normal approaching a high alpha condition (not just in the max), the issue of MCAS is a non-starter, and a nose-down force in response to an AoA error could occur in other 737's outside the Max line; this isn't new and isn't obscure, and is well known.
Not all cockpits are occupied by pilots. Pilot fly the airplane back. Passengers observe the crash.