Originally Posted by
CrowneVic
Amazing how all of this could have been avoided even without “the fix” if Boeing had just included a second AOA sensor with a miscompare feature in the standard cost of the aircraft. What gross misjudgment about additional profits on optional features.
The MCAS code would have still been “bad”, but the AOA miscompare would have saved the day, and a fix implemented without the whole fleet being grounded for an entire year, along with a complete loss of confidence in Boeing.
History repeats itself, again. American 191, the DC-10-10 disaster at ORD in May of 1979. The stick shaker came as standard equipment on the Captain’s control column only. The FO side was optional equipment. American didn’t buy the option. The Captain side lost power as a result of the No. 1 engine separation at rotation. There was no warning of the uncommanded slat retraction on the left side and no subsequent stick shaker activation. Had the nose been lowered in reaction to a stall warning, the aircraft could have been saved based on numerous simulator tests. As it was, the FO was the flying pilot on AA 191 and otherwise flew a by the book V1 cut. Stick shakers on both sides were mandated afterwards. It wouldn’t surprise me if a single engineer that worked on MCAS was even old enough to have ever heard of AA 191.