Originally Posted by
ShyGuy
Im not gonna comment on Colgan as that has been a beaten horse.
I will say, approach to stall recovery in landing configuration, RJ training, 2007 and 2008, we were taught to power up and maintain stick shaker (actually involved a light pull on the yoke). Shaker would continue and eventually you’d power out of it. The goal was to minimize altitude loss. That was airline training in a CRJ, pre-Colgan accident.
After Colgan at BUF, now the first action is to immediately reduce the AOA. That was a change, a glossed over change. I wish the Colgan report cited a contributing factor of an industry teaching to minimize altitude loss and maintain stick shaker / slight pull on yoke. But they didn’t, they simply just changed training going forward.
Was the training the same not in a CRJ? Certainly turboprops and jets act differently and would have different training.
Also, the captain did not power out of it. He added just enough power to try and recover airspeed to continue the approach, not power out of the stall and go around. This was combined with a First Officer who, in her experience, retracted the flaps because she thought extending the flaps and the stall warning were associated.