Originally Posted by The701Express

We could ask that same question of why did we decided to negotiate an LOA with the company to settle this if an arbitrator's ruling in our favor is a lock and our leverage only improves?

I'm not happy with the MGIA and it's attempt to circumvent 1.F.7, but the risk of letting one person determine it's not a JV as defined by the CBA and therefore free from the other 1.F.7 restrictions is opening a pandoras box of pain especially at an airline like jetblue that has codeshare agreements with numerous airlines, big and small, domestic and international and is always on the lookout for more partners.

What does the LAX base look like with an Alaska codeshare that includes an MGIA? FLL and MCO with an Azul codeshare and accompanying MGIA? Both of those airlines, in the case of Alaska, or their country, in the case of Azul, are mentioned in our CBA. Allowing an MGIA with Azul would steer clear of 1.F.7.d protections. I don't want to see how jetblue's greed exploits a MGIA loophole across the rest of our network.

There's potential for a very consequential loophole to be opened up if the arbitrator rules in favor of the company for 1.F.7. A 'No Vote' doesn't guarantee us protection of our scope language. A 'Yes Vote' at least sets the precedent that the MGIA in the NEA is a JV because the company negotiated a settlement with us. The LOA also keeps Javitz as the arbitrator for any further related grievances, which he surely won't look at too keenly since his reputation is on the line.

The camel got its nose in the tent with LOA 12 and the creation of the NEA. The company's greed and disregard for us pilots tried to wiggle it in farther. While far from perfect, LOA 17 stops it from going any further, ties the company's hands more with the new collars for the whole NEA, and gives us pilots the ability to kill the NEA in eight years just by withholding consent for it to continue. That's an eternity from now, but it's an expiration date for temporary scope relief that could give us a huge amount of leverage should the company need it to continue. That's no guarantee, but neither was Delta's profit sharing when it began.

At the core of this issue is the integrity of our scope language. The purpose of our strong scope language is to protect our jobs by ensuring the company can only generate the overwhelming portion of its revenue from our own flying by our own pilots. That's something we all want, have fought for and continue to fight for. While our CBA has limited exceptions, it ensures an environment where the company can't earn the lion's share of the revenue unless it's a Jetblue plane flown by Jetblue pilots. No matter how much I want to tell the company 'No' a second time, I see that as counter-productive to the ultimate goal of our scope language with too much downside risk in the future by letting the arbitrator rule unilaterally. Voting ​​​​​'Yes' means strengthening the current CBA language through this process, except for the limited relief, has ensured Jetblue pilot growth throughout this decade, while also earning the ability to kill the whole agreement at the end of the decade if its not to our liking or use that threat to bargain even greater benefits for the pilot group should that leverage exist.
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I havent mentioned compensation, UTS, or c91 because, while those are important to me and can be argued on their own merits, this is a scope grievance and the integrity of our section 1 language has been and remains paramount to me, so I felt my reasoning needed to be stated.
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