Origins of the Current Pilot Shortage
To ensure the Air Force remains staffed with the appropriate quantities of all types of pilots the Service monitors the aircrew management pipeline. This framework encompasses three components: pilot production, absorption and retention. Each segment is equally important, and the flow of pilots through each phase must be balanced to ensure aircrew communities are fully staffed with pilots of all experience levels. Following the end of the Cold War, the USAF underwent a massive drawdown that limited production and absorption capacity. The drawdown decreased USAF manpower end strength which greatly reduced the number of pilot positions, and decreased the total number of flying units. The active component endured a 48% decrease in the primary mission aircraft inventory (PMAI) (Taylor, Bigelow and Ausink, 2009). With fewer line aircraft on the tarmac, fewer sorties could be flown each day. This reality was felt most severely by junior pilots, who needed to fly frequently in order to promptly complete their training objectives. With a decreased stock of aircraft, the service could not absorb as many new fighter pilots. The scarcity of training sorties increases the challenge for new fighter pilots to fly 500 training hours, and officially be recognized as “experienced” pilots.1
The post-Cold War drawdown also motivated the closure of one of the service’s four primary pilot training bases (Taylor, Bigelow and Ausink, 2009).2 The Air Force closed Williams AFB in 1993, decreasing the USAF’s pilot production capability. With only three undergraduate pilot training (UPT) bases remaining, the USAF simply could not produce as many pilots per year as it could during the Cold War