The pilot shortage argument is a red herring.

The company has been and will be able to continue filling seats even if there is an uptick in people leaving.

They have done the math. How much does a new pilot contract with the improvements we are looking for, including a minimum raise of only 20% thanks to Alaska and Delta setting the bar there, let alone a much higher raise that many of us are seeking, cost the company each year if the company agrees to it? I’m no business analyst, but my guess is the answer is at least in the nine figures and probably in the ten figures. The Delta MEC stated that their 18% raise will cost $100 million/month.

How much does 10%, or even higher, new hire attrition cost the company each year? My guess is probably at least an order of magnitude less than nine or ten figures. That’s not even accounting for the cost-saving effect that newer hires leaving has on the average pilot cost by creating a downward pressure on average pilot longevity.

And it’s also not accounting for the arguably more important intangible positive effect for the company of what RB called “desperation hiring.” Desperation hiring is when SWA hires “black sheep” candidates who would have had trouble getting hired elsewhere for various reasons or were guys who were in desperate situations like, for example, furloughed from other carriers. RB, who used to run a pilot hiring consultancy firm focused on SWA pilot candidates said SWA specialized in and had a preference for desperation hires because, once on the seniority list, desperation hires tended to feel indebted to and loyal to the corporation.

ALPA has come out and said the idea of a pilot shortage is a myth. They published a report detailing why they believe that.

Trying to push the idea of the enormous cost to the company of not agreeing to an industry leading contract because of its impact on pilot hiring and retention in the context of a pilot shortage which doesn’t even clearly exist doesn’t really add up. To the company, the math doesn’t compute.

What does compute?

The cost to the company of a strike and the cost to the company of passengers booking away in the face of the credible threat of a strike. Back in 1997, when American’s pilots threatened to go out on strike with their 9,300 pilots (roughly the same size as SWA today), the estimated cost of a strike per day to American in 1997 dollars was $30 million. Adjusted for inflation, that equals $55 million per day in 2022 dollars. American reportedly also lost tens of millions of dollars in revenue in the days leading up to their potential strike as passengers booked away in the fear of American shutting down if the pilots struck.

If SWA is staring down the barrel of losing $55 million or more dollars per day, that’s $1.65 billion per month in lost revenue as the result of a strike. Of course, that’s using American’s numbers from 1997. SWA’s 2022 numbers may significantly differ from those numbers but I think the point remains: a strike could cost SWA orders of magnitude more money per month than even historically high pilot attrition might cost SWA in a year.

Do you think SWA wants to get anywhere near that? I don’t.

I bet if they looked at our pilot group as posing a credible threat to them of being able to inflict that kind of loss, they’d very quickly take us much more seriously.