Originally Posted by
Prospect
Question for you. Do you think what you're proposing ($550/tfp) is anywhere near the realm of possibility of what SWAPA is even trying to attach? Do you think it would be productive to go to the company and say, "we want to keep all of the parts of our contract that are better than OALs, match them on all the parts that are worse, and we want you to pay us enough to make more than the couple top earning pilots in Delta history, assuming that all of their flying is on the 76 from the start and not the 75 (which is the actual case), despite that they are flying much larger planes that generate more revenue."
I don't know what SWAPA is asking for right now.
For argument's sake, let's say that SWAPA did go to the company and say, "We demand to keep all of the parts of our contract that are better than OALs, match them on all the parts that are worse, and we want rates that achieve a 30% career compensation premium on DL's current earliest upgrade scenario at the ten-year point." I imagine the company would not be open to that idea. I imagine they're not open to the idea of paying us more than some average of Delta's and Alaska's 737-800/700 rates.
Given that our negotiations play out on the battlefield of a RLA-governed landscape, in the current pilot hiring market, it then arguably becomes more important to have an idea of what the RLA says about reasonability and good faith bargaining than what the company thinks of our demands. As you know, the RLA itself mandates both sides in a dispute must "exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions." But what does that even mean?
It can be a long discussion. Wrapping the topic up in a crisp, tweet-sized summary does it a disservice; it doesn't bow well to the brevity of 280 characters. If you want to read a more in-depth analysis of the issue, check out
this thread.
To make a very long story short, though, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged:
...the labor laws allow economic strength ultimately to control the establishment of contract terms, regardless of which side may have better reasons for its position … It is ‘permissible for a party to engage in `hard bargaining,' utilizing its economic power to its advantage to retain as many rights as possible’ subject only to necessity that there be a subjective ‘desire to reach ultimate agreement. (Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. TWA, 682 F. Supp. 1003, No. No. 86-6030-CV-SJ-6 (Dist. Court, WD Missouri 1988)
RLA jurisprudence offers a smorgasbord of instances where unions have been accused of making outlandish demands, yet were found to be within the boundaries of the RLA's reasonability parameters. Consider the TIA flight attendants, who had the audacity to demand a nearly threefold hike in their payroll expense. The ensuing legal battle saw TIA present the flight attendants’ demands, which exceeded 200% of TIA's total 1976 profits and represented a staggering 294.6% increase in flight attendant payroll costs, as a shining example of bad faith. For perspective, demanding a tripling of pay is an even more audacious bargaining move than if SWAPA were to ask for a 12-yr CA rate of $550/TFP at DOS. So, how did the court react to TIA's charge of the FA's negotiating in bad faith? The court ruled:
The union disputed the claim that there would be a cost increase estimated to be 294% but Chief Judge Peckham found it simply "unnecessary to the resolution [of the good faith bargaining issue] to determine the actual figures. [The airline] is effectively asking the court to hold that the sheer size of the Teamsters' economic demands, and the distance between the parties after a long period of negotiations, amounts to a lack of reasonable effort by the union to reach an agreement." The district court concluded it was forbidden by "the strong federal labor policy against governmental interference with the substantive terms of collective-bargaining agreements'" from pursuing the matter further. (Air Line Pilots Association International v. Spirit Airlines, Inc, No. Case No. 08-CV-13785 (Dist. Court, ED Michigan 2009) citing Trans Intern Airlines v. Intern Broth, etc., 650 F. 2d 949 (1980))
In fact, the judge in the TIA decision went on to explain:
The court can find no previous decision under the RLA, nor can TIA suggest one, which has inferred lack of reasonable effort solely from the size of the proposals put forth by the parties. (Trans Intern Airlines v. Intern Broth, etc., 650 F. 2d 949 (1980))
Interesting, huh? What does all of that say about what might happen if SWAPA did actually demand $550/TFP at DOS?
Or, take the case of REA Express hauling the union in front of a federal judge, crying foul that the union's audacious demands would send them spiraling into bankruptcy. It begs the question, right? Are the union's demands crossing the line of reasonability if they're substantial enough to potentially push the company off the financial cliff? The court's verdict? Not so much:
REA is a private enterprise corporation operating under a laissez faire economy; the circumstance that it cannot meet the demands of a competitive system and may face bankruptcy, if such be the fact, does not require its employees to accept a wage they deem inadequate and to surrender their legal right to strike once the procedures under the [RLA] have been met. To hold that the employees' assertion of their rights manifests a failure to exert every reasonable effort to resolve all disputes and thereby constitutes a [RLA] violation is without validity. It suggests that a court has the power to apply a coercive force upon the employees to yield to the carrier's offer even though they deem it inadequate—in effect, it would impose upon them the financing of an undercapitalized carrier … While BRAC was required to exert every reasonable effort to end the dispute, this did not mean that it was required to surrender its position entirely, or the legal rights of its members. (REA Express, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Railway, Etc, 358 F. Supp. 760, No. No. 72 Civ. 4492 (Dist. Court, SD New York 1973)).
That's also pretty interesting, IMO.
So, the question that's been gnawing at you: what would happen if SWAPA actually demanded $550/TFP at DOS and $600 at DOS + 3 years and commensurately "outlandish" contract terms in other sections? All I can say is, RLA case law has given us some food for thought. The ball's in your court.