https://www.realcleardefense.com/art...n_1020522.html
Some excerpts:
Within the Department of Defense (DoD), COVID-19 is attributed with causing the deaths of 96 service members.
The loss of these service members is unquestionably tragic. Yet, in many ways the American people could look at this relatively low number as a triumph due, in part, to the mandated mitigation measures. After all, with a total of 453,456 documented COVID-19 infections, a survivability rate of 99.9997% should seem like a huge win for DoD leaders who prioritized the health of the Joint Force.[ii] However, this survivability rate does not appear to differ significantly from the pre-vaccine survivability rate of the rest of the U.S. military-aged population, with all 25-34 year-olds at 99.9943% and all 35-44 year-olds at 99.984% survivability respectively.[iii] With such a minimal return, particularly for military-age persons, the decision to mandate nearly every possible health mitigation was not without risks. Along with the mandated mitigation measures came a legal and constitutional crisis, unprecedented in scope in U.S. military history. If ignored and left unresolved, this constitutional crisis will continue to negatively impact the Joint Force and the future of the nation—long after the COVID-19 pandemic has become a distant memory.
Note: Given that the military is prescreened for medical problems and their age- matched civilian cohort was not, it would really be expected that military member would be expected to be
less at risk than the population as a whole, particularly since military members are periodically examined, their medical status is assessed if they are found (either through treatment or periodic screening) and either medically retired or TDRL'd if they have any serious chronic problems.In the public health community this is known as the "healthy worker effect".
https://journals.lww.com/epidem/abst..._worker.9.aspx
Conclusion
The U.S. military has a moral duty to hotwash (i.e., after-action review) every aspect of this complicated event, to include reviewing every process, every order, and every decision. Leaders should want to know what was done right, what was done wrong, and what the associated cost were for any errors. They should seek a final and unequivocable review of the legality of the military order itself, because its lawfulness remains ambiguous in the minds of many despite several judicial rulings. Finally, once all has been analyzed, the institution – if it hopes to retain any credibility at all – should acknowledge the lessons learned, own up to them, and endeavor to never repeat the same mistakes again.