Originally Posted by
CLazarus
Yeah, you probably missed it. Got another Economist article handy from March that details Russian problems with artillery barrels (and the full article above touches on it as well). Not gonna post it, but they are wearing out barrels faster than they could ever hope to produce them. They can produce a lot of shells, but those are kinda useless without lots of guns to fire them. The bottom line is they will be facing major issues next year. I'll keep posting articles from other sources that underline just how precarious things really are for the Russians going forward.
No question, logistics is a difficult issue for everyone at this level of intensity. But both sides are innovating, finding workarounds. The real problem for the Ukraine is simply manpower. Producing 18 year olds doesn't require skilled labor but it is a long lead time process (generally taking at least 18 and 3/4 years) and the Ukraine had one of the lowest fertility rates in Europe even before the Crimean takeover. At its height the population was about 52 million but it lost a lot of people due to old age and out migration. But outmigration right now is at least 8 million (both to EU and Belarus/Russia) from about 35 million before the latest unpleasantness started. The population is older than it was and not what most countries would consider to be conscriptable age but if they draft the 18-25 year olds they really are putting themselves in a demographic doom loop. So they are drafting 25-60 year olds, and that in a country where male life expectancy is only about 65 to begin with. You have geriatric drill instructors dealing with geriatric draftees.
And of course, the longer they have refugees in the EU, the fewer of those will ever come back as they build new lives out from under the shadow of the bear. Ukraine is a proud country but it never was particularly prosperous with a very low GDP per capita, even by Eastern Europe standards...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_o...PP)_per_capita
Here is a paper from about two years ago. Even then it was acknowledged that many refugees would likely never return:
https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief...fugees-go-home
Executive summary
About 15 percent of the population has fled Ukraine since the start of the Russian aggression in February 2022. Nearly 4 million Ukrainians have already registered in European Union countries. Based in part on evidence that few refugees return voluntarily to poor countries once they settle in rich countries, even once security is re-established at home, it can be expected that large numbers of Ukrainian refugees are likely to remain in European host countries, and will likely be joined by others, including many men that remained to fight when the conflict is over.
Ukraine already has a long history of emigration. Its shattered economy, the likelihood of a protracted conflict and significant uncertainty with regard to its final status reinforce the argument that most refugees will not return and many more will join them. EU nations must prepare for. There will be large short-term costs and long-term economic gains from Ukrainian immigration in Europe. The best way to help Ukraine, and to moderate the likely outflow of its people, will be to assist in the country’s reconstruction, and not to place artificial impediments to the immigration of individuals who have already suffered greatly.
Having massive bombing, shelling, mining and infrastructure damage as well as massive debt (a lot of the EU aid came as loans, not grants - as did some of ours) will not be a great incentive for expatriates to repatriate.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/...bt-of-ukraine/