In a nutshell, the effect of batch sizes forced the company to pay 300% to cover most premium trips (200% to an IA/GS pilot + 100% to a 23.M.7 pilot). That effect went completely unanticipated by management when they signed an LOA agreeing to batch sizes at the onset of COVID.

Paying 300% to cover trips was unsustainable for the company in the long term. In an effort to obtain free contractual relief, they gaslit ALPA and a portion of the pilot group into believing that their problem was actually our problem. They did so via three primary methods:

1. By telling us that the 23.M.7 process was abrogating seniority in assigning premium trips. This was true to an extent, but temporary.
2. By not paying the 23.M.7 pilot their 100% pay by default, forcing ALPA to use its manual resources to track and report violations. Only about 25-50% of violations were being discovered and paid at the time. More on this below.
3. By threatening to use 23.M.7 anytime they wanted, even weeks in advance. This was laughable because they were basically threatening to triple their costs on a routine basis.

Management knew that #2 was about to crumble, due in large part to automated enforcement software that was on the way. Our newly-signed contract gave ALPA direct API access to our scheduling system. A vendor was already under contract by ALPA to develop software that would utilize that access. Eventually, the software would find and report every 23.M.7 violation, eliminating the company’s ability to evade paying 300% for most premium trips. Management pressured ALPA for a rushed solution, knowing full well that this debacle was about to become far more expensive for the company.

ALPA filed a grievance, arguing that 23.M.7 was meant for emergency use only, not routine use. Management doubled down on #3 above. They successfully frightened ALPA into believing that they would lose in arbitration. The worst case scenario, ALPA believed, was that the arbitrator would give the company an unlimited ability to use 23.M.7 (i.e. pay 300% to cover trips) whenever they felt like it.

A very slim majority (9 out of 17) of our MEC members fell for it, deciding to forfeit before the issue ever reached an arbitrator.
In conjunction with the chairman, they proceeded to gave away hundreds of millions of dollars in negotiating leverage by voluntarily surrendering our hard-fought contractual batch sizes. In return, the company “promised” that they wouldn’t use 23.M.7 outside of 8 hours before report time. Said another way, the company promised ALPA that they would only pay 100% to 200% to cover most trips instead of 300%. We received absolutely nothing of value in return. Our most significant negotiating leverage in years was blown by ALPA overnight.