If one wants to understand the main challenges the Ukrainian state is facing as part of its war effort, the first would be the mobilisation campaign and the human resources in general: Ukraine simply does not have that many people compared to Russia. The necessity to sustain mobilisation at 30 000 troops per month, as stated by Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, remains critical. If we factor in new directions, such as the Sumy region, it will require extra resources and manpower. If the Armed Forces of Ukraine were to begin contemplating launching another counteroffensive, for instance, to regain some of the lost territories, it would put even more strain on the troops.
The secondary challenge that stems from it is the quality of training: one’s ability to recruit enough people is different from one’s ability to give them the necessary training, and this is where Ukraine is confronted with a tremendous problem.
The third challenge is the pace of procurement, which applies to both the Ukrainian defence budget and the military and technical assistance from the foreign partners. On top of that comes the chaos in some partner countries—the US, first and foremost—which is rather damaging to Ukraine’s ability to plan. For instance, we may be publicly promised—and counting on—some specific type of military assistance, but what eventually arrives, as well as the terms when it arrives, happen to be quite different.
Moreover, now that the US’ position has changed dramatically, we have been suffering from a dire shortage in anti-missile defence systems, especially ballistic missile defence. In this area, unfortunately, there is very little that Europe can offer. One can already see that the Russians have been taking advantage of this shortcoming: attacks on the cities of Sumy and Kryvyi Rih before that, when densely populated areas were targeted, resulting in a high death toll among civilians. Meanwhile, Ukraine simply has no defence systems to intercept such ballistic missiles.
Europe hopes to turn Ukraine into a “steel porcupine” that proves “indigestible to future invaders.” What are Ukraine’s most urgent needs, and how can Europe meet them?
Europe is an entity that is comprised of several dozen different states. When taken together, their economic potential is much higher than that of Russia and the US. They could, essentially, meet the entire spectrum of the defence-related needs that Ukraine has in terms of weapons and equipment: from ammunition to nuclear weapons, from aircraft to aircraft carriers. In fact, Europe can produce and provide everything. The real question concerns the readiness of specific European countries and specific local manufacturers to supply such materiel, as well as the ability to cover the costs of such deliveries.
One has to take into account the fact that any type of weapon requires at least nine months to produce. And given that there is no real sense of urgency in Europe right now, the realistic timeline starts at one year, or even longer. In the meantime, Ukraine needs a lot of weapons, as in the conditions of a hot war, equipment gets lost, damaged, or worn out at a much higher pace.
As to what Ukraine needs most, the most critical demand is still manpower, followed by training. Then comes ammunition of all types, missile defence systems, and air defence systems as a derivative, as well as long-range strike capabilities, implying 100 km or more. The list continues with armoured vehicles, artillery, communications systems, radio electronic warfare capabilities, etc. Moreover, these demands have not changed much over the last years. Nor will they change in the coming months.
The understanding of these needs in European capitals, however, varies depending on the country. Among hundreds of political and military officials in each of those countries, there is no shared understanding either. There are as many opinions as there are people.