Swamped? The Math of Ukraine’s Missile Crisis

There is a cold logic in Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression. He believes that Russia has more of everything— more men, more tanks, more aircraft, more drones, more missiles, and a greater tolerance to squander it all for the leader’s great project of subjugating Ukraine.

In one area at least, his math is right. An examination of the output numbers for ballistic and other missiles, and drones, show sharply rising output at low cost, while Western interceptors are produced far more slowly and at much greater expense.

It’s an equation that risks ultimately swamping Ukraine’s air defenses and opening the country’s military and its civilians to unchecked attack. (It should also alert the wider West to the risks it now faces from massed, coordinated aerial assault.) Russia’s aerial campaign may not win the war — Ukrainians stubbornly refuse to surrender on Putin’s demands for capitulation — but it can do very extensive damageand greatly raise the cost.

So what are the numbers?

In June, Russia’s defense industry produced approximately 195 strategic missile units. Output included 60 to 70 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, 10 to 15 Kinzhalhypersonic missiles, and 60 to 63 Kh-101 cruise missiles.

This production volume was enabled by post-2022 infrastructure expansion at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant. Modifications included two additional workshops, 2,500 personnel, and computer numerical control (CNC) machining systems sourced from China, Taiwan, and Belarus for airframe and control system fabrication.

Rostec and Tactical Missiles Corporation coordinate labor assignment, component procurement, and material intake under centralized state contracting. Input flows are routed through protected domestic supply channels. No commercial subcontractors are involved. No multi-agency approvals are required.

Add to that skyrocketing rises in drone production, including a sevenfold increase in output of modernized and largely autonomous Iranian Shahed drones, which now include everything from Nvidia chips to thermal vision and hardened navigation — Ukraine’s military describes this as representing “a challenge to our entire doctrine of air defense.”

What of the West’s defensive missile production? Interceptor manufacturing in NATO-aligned states remains constrained by fixed output ceilings and delayed production line expansion. Lockheed Martin produced 500 PAC-3 MSE interceptors in 2024. Stated 2025 output is 600 units, with a projected ceiling of 650 by 2027. Japan contributes 30 units annually. Expansion plans are delayed by component shortfalls in seeker assemblies. GEM-T interceptor production in Germany will not be operational before the third quarter of next year.

​​​​​Ukraine operates between six and eight Patriot batteries. As of July, PAC-3 missile transfers from the United States have been suspended following (contested) US claims that it must address depletion of its own inventories. French-Italian SAMP/T and Crotale systems inside Ukraine are non-operational due to total interceptor exhaustion. Forward-positioned Ukrainian Patriot batteries held no remaining PAC-3 interceptors as of June 30, 2025.

Russian missile production in the second quarter of this year totaled 585 units. PAC-3 output from the United States, Japan, and European partners will remain capped at 650 units annually. Russian manufacturing operates on state-issued throughput mandates. NATO-aligned interceptor production remains tied to peacetime contracting models and delayed component delivery schedules.
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The outcome of all this is predictable. In a typical engagement, interception of six incoming Iskander missiles requires 12-18 PAC-3 interceptors. The resulting expenditure, between $48m-$72m, exceeds Russia’s monthly ballistic production cost by a factor of two. Ukrainian stocks are depleted faster than they can be replenished. Donor nations have not adjusted procurement models to reflect the adversary’s unit economics.

As of mid-2025, no Western supplier has implemented structural reforms to reduce interceptor unit cost. No integrated missile defense production program exists at scale. Contractual reconfiguration remains unaddressed.

Russian missile platforms now incorporate counter-intercept adaptations. Modified Iskander variants deploy radar decoys, irregular flight paths, and terminal-phase maneuvers designed to degrade Patriot effectiveness. Ukrainian data from April and May 2025 confirms declining intercept rates during saturation strikes. Interceptor overuse combined with degraded hit probability accelerates depletion.

Western procurement remains optimized for low-volume, precision defense. No scalable framework exists to match sustained missile attrition under cost pressure. Current industrial posture is insufficient to cover multi-theater needs.

Stockpile asymmetry now functions as a strategic weapon. Unit cost disparities can be converted into coercive leverage over time. This is simply not being addressed in the West, which can only be seen as highly vulnerable to attack by swarms of drones and missiles that it will not be able to fend off.