The slow recognition of the
changing character of warfare and the
rapid innovation cycle of the adversary is eerily similar to the rise of drones on the battlefield. The drone threat mirrors the IED’s asymmetric cost dynamic.
That dynamic is what makes today’s counter-drone conversation feel like déjà vu. The Defense Department’s counter-drone strategy rests on
five pillars: deepen understanding and awareness of trends and threats, disrupt and degrade threat networks, defend against threats, deliver solutions at speed and scale, and develop and design a force for unmanned systems warfare. Succinctly, the framework expands upon the three-pillar counter-IED approach and formalizes the need for rapid acquisitions.
To determine whether adopting a well-worn strategy is warranted, it is instructive to examine the similarities and differences between IEDs and drones. Both are ubiquitous on modern battlefields due to a single overarching attribute: cost asymmetry. Each benefit from an
abundance of dual-use civilian components that enable scalable manufacturing and proliferation while
complicating interdiction and control efforts. Technical know-how diffuses easily across the battlespace and, as with IEDs, effective drone defense still depends on well-prepared forces, intelligence fusion, and disciplined training.
Colloquially known in some circles as “the poor man’s air force,” drones deliver aerial effects once reserved for traditional militaries. All air forces rely on aerial platforms for reconnaissance and interdiction, but drones offer these capabilities at a fraction of the cost. Compared with a traditional air force consisting of manned aircraft, drones trade individual flexibility and platform capability for sheer volume and distribution.
Drones deliver a key capability over IEDs: the ability to hunt for targets. Whereas IEDs acted as ambush predators, emplaced along predictable routes, drones can search for and approach targets from multiple directions, erasing the perceived safe rear area. Drones extend area denial and constrain maneuver
more effectively than IEDs or mines.
Drone networks also differ from IED networks in the number of key individuals involved. IED bombmakers were required to manufacture the devices, even though components were easy to obtain. In contrast, many drone systems draw from a mature global supply chain and require only simple assembly or modification. This shifts the importance from the manufacturer to the operator, specifically, the drone pilot. While skill levels vary, the gap between novice and expert drone pilots is narrower than among bombmakers, considering there are more prospective pilots. Drone piloting
suits gamers well, and
advanced simulators can speed up training. As autonomy improves, the significance of
individual pilot skill will matter even less.