Peter Magyar, the Hungarian politician most likely to defeat Viktor Orbán, promises “regime change” but signals continuity on several core policies. The European Union should manage expectations and prepare for a more complex relationship than a simple post-Orbán reset.

With less than two months to go before Hungary’s 12 April elections, the Tisza party led by Péter Magyar is polling ahead of Orban’s Fidesz. For the first time since 2010, a change of government appears genuinely possible.

The stakes are high. A fifth consecutive term for Orbán would further entrench what the European Parliament has described as a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy” at the heart of Europe, and reinforce Budapest’s capacity to obstruct common EU positions, including on security. But Orbán’s defeat would not automatically translate into smooth relations with Brussels.

This raises the question of what a Magyar-led government would look like in practice. A former Fidesz member and government official, and the former spouse of Orbán's ex-EU Affairs and Justice Minister, Magyar entered politics in early 2024. Running on an anti-corruption and anti-state-capture platform, his party won nearly 30% of the vote in the European elections, securing seven MEPs and joining the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP).

Regime change without full rupture

Tisza’s manifesto, published in early February, outlines a broadly pro-European trajectory. The party says that it “chooses Europe”, pledges to rebuild trust with EU and NATO allies and commits to joining the eurozone by 2030. Restoring the rule of law is framed primarily as a means to unlock €18 billion in EU funds currently frozen over systemic violations.

Yet EU leaders should not assume that a Magyar government would mark a clean break with Orbán-era policies. On Ukraine, Tisza’s manifesto is notably thin, beyond opposing Ukraine’s accelerated accession. Magyar has repeatedly stated that he would not reverse Hungary's current policy of non-support. While he signals an intention to reduce dependence on Russia, his proposed timeline – by 2035 – falls well behind the EU’s 2027 target. Tisza further opposes the Commission’s proposal for the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF), arguing that it disadvantages Hungary, and rejects the EU migration and asylum pact.