Need proof that the USAF can not learn from the lessons of the past. There are multiple studies out there (several mentioned in this project) dealing with the subject of UAS manning, unfortunately we don't have access to them all. This is just one of them, and unfortunately it was from a different era of UAS employment.
A research paper from 1999 on the subject of UAS manning requirements:
https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay1999/saas/tobin.pdf
Take into account that this paper was written in 1999, when the capabilities and scope of employment of the systems were infantile when compared to today. There are very little similarities to the Predator of 1999 and the ones today. Any discussions of difficulty of employment from this paper would be magnified by multiple factors today. Also, keep in mind that the author of the paper admits that his personal opinion going in to this project was different than his conclusion.
Select quotes:
"It was not until late into my research when I had the opportunity to spend some time with the 11 RS and experience their operations first hand that I realized the single best analogy for those operators—their job is identical to what any other pilot does except for where they sit. Considerable airmanship and piloting skills are required to maximize mission effectiveness, to ingrate UAV operations with the rest of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) process, and to fly safely in and among other manned aircraft."
"The focus group discussions also revealed a belief that manned flying experience was required for Predator AVO training. The respondent's major emphasis was that all tasks and experience meld together to teach airmanship. Their belief was that, regardless of where the Air Force decided to draw their AVO candidates from, the AVO pipeline training should be similar to undergraduate pilot training (UPT)."
"The primary emphasis of Air Force training is on airmanship. This is a somewhat nebulous term used to encapsulate a myriad of skills, qualities, and attributes. Airmanship represents the pilot’s ability to assimilate a comprehensive understanding of the aircraft, its systems, its environment, the surrounding threats, the plethora of rules and regulations regarding its
operation, the mission, etc. From all of this, the pilot must deduce sound judgements and courses of action. Thus, the role of the UAV operator is synonymous with the role of a pilot in any other aircraft. They are responsible for every aspect of the mission from receiving the tasking, carefully and thoroughly planning the mission, successfully executing the
mission, safely recovering the aircraft, and completing any post mission requirements. The stick-and-rudder skills are only one aspect of what makes a successful pilot.
"The Air Force needs effective employers of weapon systems, not just operators. The vast majority of potential UAV systems envisioned by the Scientific Advisory Board (see Table 1) would operate in the heart of the airspace structure. This will occur at the altitudes and in the geographic area where other air assets operate, potentially hundreds of other aircraft. Consequently, there is significant potential for future UAV operations to include multiple systems, with different objectives, flying to satisfy various target sets. As such, the requirements for operators of these vehicles should be synonymous the requirements to operate the manned systems with perhaps the exception of certain physiological requirements not relevant to a stationary ground control station."
He also addresses the use of enlisted, non-rated, and contractor personnel. In his discussion, he points out that the pre-training required to make qualified mission commanders would resemble UPT if your actual intent was to duplicate the capabilities of the rated operator. The current USAF leadership is going to try to skip this step.
The new class of non-rated personnel is going to go through the same exact syllabus at Creech as all of the previous rated personnel. Putting aside any bias, can you honestly say that previous aviation experience is so invaluable that a non-rated person and a rated person with previous experience are going to come out of the same syllabus with the same potential to perform combat operations? Were the previously trained rated operators receiving that much useless additional training? If they are not going to have the same inherent capabilities, how are you going to provide them additional training and supervision in a combat squadron that is already experiencing 24/7/365 real world operations with a near unsustainable ops tempo?
What will happen in reality was foreshadowed in a discussion in the paper concerning the satellite community (although it was unintentional on the author's part). When they transitioned the role of satellite operator from officer to enlisted, they went from assigning those positions to personnel with engineering degrees to those with potentially no college degree. When the enlisted personnel got to the training, they found that it was too difficult with respect to the technical aspects. The result was that they changed the training by reducing the technical degree of difficulty. The author then goes on to say that there was no reduced operational degradation associated with this. According to who, and by using what criteria? People tend to underestimate the requirements of fields they are not in, but hold to the requirements of the field they are in. That is because they are thoroughly familiar with what is actually required. I am sure an engineer-degreed satellite operator could expound on exactly what the potential cost of that reduction would be.
That is the way of the USAF leadership, just say "It is so" and it will be so. How can you reduce the quality of the training without sacrificing capability? Can we cut the UPT syllabus in half and still produce the SAME caliber of pilots? Can we lower the minimum level of proficiency required to graduate UPT and still produce the SAME caliber of pilots? Need non-flying analogies - are you willing to cut the medical training of our doctors in half? How about the training required of police officers? When you reduce the entry requirements, and you reduce the training requirements, you WILL reduce the operational capabilities - the question you have to ask is "how much of a reduction of capabilities are we willing to accept?".
No general is qualified in any UAS system, therefore no general understands what is exactly required to effectively employ these systems. No general has talked to Army personnel who received sub-standard support from a UAS system, therefore no general understands the potential cost of lowering the capabilities of those who operate them. Let me be more cynical and say that, to some generals, expediency and preservation of career progression may actually take precedence to the potential cost of reduced UAS support to the ground troop.
These programs were set in motion before the messages were released, and the decisions were made with NO REFERENCE TO COMBAT CAPABILITY. When it comes to the lives of our soldiers (the same soldiers my entire career was devoted to - after all the USAF is inherently a combat-support organization), I know what the priority is.