Sputnik - Don't try to make those statements into something they very clearly were not, especially when taken in the context of the entire post. I thought long about whether to post my "There I was" routine - note that I have never made mention to it before now. In the end, I figured the most effective way to answer this quote from WAFP: "You sit pretty in your Reserve/Guard job not worrying about that next drop down 365 or getting selected for convoy duty as a pilot. I'll tell you what, you take a year remote to Iraq as a convoy commander and then tell me that you are "happy" with how you were employed."

This sort of attitude is typical of the new USAF, this is not the first time I have seen this. Because you aren't out there sucking up as many bad deals as me right now, you don't know what it is like with your high and mighty attitude. While these guys were in high school and college, we were out taking care of the business that needed to be taken care of. But, that fact is of little concern - this is a new generation. Now they show up, see the older guys soaking up some perceived good deal (of course it is a good deal that they are just as qualified to man) and whine about how they have to go out and do all the work while we just sit and bark orders from our high throne. Sound like I summarized it accurately?

I didn't even know who WAFP was, but he obviously takes offense to the view that the young officers need to do their time at the bottom before enjoying the perks that come from having been there and done that. I was a UPT instructor for a few years a while back - want to know the most often asked question from USAF students? "How many days a year does that MWS deploy?" What? First of all, that question can't even be answered with any accuracy - who knows what will happen in the future. Second, you are not even 1 year into a 11 year USAF commitment and you are already asking how much will you be gone? Why did you join the USAF - most wars that I know of in recent history have been fought on foreign soil. These guys were certainly not destined to be those Lt's in the squadron at the scheduling desk trying to get in on every deployment they could, learning as much as they could as fast as they could. In case you were wondering, questions about how the MWS contributes to the mission and how do we do the mission ranks a distant last. In contrast, most USMC students state that their number 1 choice is based on supporting the grunts. I actually had to convince some of my good students that an F-18 can provide an equivalent level (albeit a different type) of support to the troops as a CH-46 and it was OK for them to pick jets. For the record, I never had one USMC student ask about how many days a particular asset deployed each year, not once.

And that brings me to why I keep mentioning the "troops in the field." As of now, our entire war effort is supporting those troops in the field. Everything. All of our air cover over Iraq is dedicated in support of them, all of our airlift is in support of them, everything we do related to the war is in support of them. The entire purpose for the existence of air power in Iraq and Afghanistan is to provide for the troops, keep them safe, and allow them to do their job unimpeded. I emphasize that because, if you are a USAF leader making a decision on how to proceed, the number one question you need to ask is yourself is "how does this improve or detract from our wartime mission?" Unfortunately, how many decisions of the USAF leadership have you seen with this as the Number 1 concern? None, they talk about rank spread in a squadron, they talk about enlisted/officer ratio, they talk about career progression, they talk about minimizing costs - but it never seems obvious that our number one mission (supporting the troops on the ground) is the primary concern. And, in discussing who should the USAF man the UAS with, how many people have used the effect of our support of the troops in their posts? They have talked about robbing experience from the cockpit and wanting to send someone else to the UAS, but no one has articulated how their view impacts the support of the troops. And there are varying degrees of support for the troops. The pilot bringing the pallet of canned corn to the theater doesn't have nearly the direct impact on the lives of the troops as the A-10 laying down 30mm on an enemy in close contact with our troops. Everyone always thinks their MWS needs the most qualified personnel, but the other system can take the new guys - they don't include that "support of the troops" in the equation. Until it is obvious that the USAF is putting the "troops on the ground" at the top of the decision matrix, I will keep mentioning it.

As for the speed of the UAS, the Reaper may be more capable than you think - and while as fast as may have been a slight exaggeration, it isn't that far off.

I am not a proponent for replacing all aircraft with UAV's and I am not a defender of UAV's in particular - just a proponent of placing mission first. And since the UAV's are currently the mission, I am proponent of sending our experienced people there. As for the other aircraft, you need to look at the capabilities and (more importantly) the limitations of each. The details are not appropriate for public discussion, but one can imagine environments where each of those airplanes individually or all of them would not be suitable for the mission. It has nothing to do with UAV's not living up to the expectations.