Ugh. These type of "expert" opinions really **** me off. I wasn't going to respond, but since this is a public board media/lawyers might see this, I'll give it a go.
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The two runways in question share the same common run-up area. The extended taxiway to the correct runway, runway 22 was closed due To construction.
Actually it was not closed. There was no notamed closure at the time of departure, and there was no construction taking place on that runway at the time of the accident. Further more, runway 22 would have been the runway that the flight SHOULD have departed from. 4/22 is the LONG runway at the airport.
It has always been difficult to tell between the two runways when you are taxiing out. The natural thing to do is to take the wrong one. It is just there and you are always tempted to take it. When I flew out of LEX we always checked each other at least three times to make sure we were taking the correct runway. We checked the chart, we checked to make sure the correct runway number was at the end and we always double checked the FMS generated moving map.
As somebody that has flown into LEX numerous times, I will agree that the runway layout is confusing at the runup end of 22/26. I think we can also agree that utilizing the proper airport diagram and ensuring you know where you are is a good idea. That said, the CRJ FMS moving map isn't worth diddly squat for taxiing around on the airport, as it depicts only the runway that is plugged into the FMS, and not in any "real time" scale. The resolution just doesn't provide for accurate taxi movements.
Most FMS systems will have a warning called "runway dissimilarity" pop up in magenta when your position at takeoff doesn't match the runway you programmed into the computer. This would not happen at LEX since you are virtually in the same spot when you take either runway.
I also agree with this statement. The FMS in the CRJ allows pilots to select the departure runway while inputting the flight plan at the gate. The crew then can "quick update" the FMS position prior to taking the runway (or while in position), by pushing the TO/GA buttons on the thrust levers, or selecting "runway update" on the box. It was not uncommon to get "FMS DR" (Dead Reckoning) messages on the ground if the aircraft couldn't pick up 3 or more DME signals in GPS inop aircraft.
When this is done, the FMS will compare the known location of the preprogrammed runway with the actual location of the plane (as determined through GPS and DME/DME.)
However, as previously mentioned,the difference in location between the two runways would most likely not be enough to generate an error (FMS "POS DIFF") message.
Also if the aircraft was not equipped with GPS (There still are some CRJ's out there that aren't), the position error tolerances would have been much greater. In my experience with CRJs that didn't have GPS available, it was not uncommon to get "FMS DR" (Dead Reckoning) messages on the ground at smaller fields when the FMS could not get strong DME signals from more than 3 or 4 stations. Usually cleared itself up in the first 2-3 minutes of flight, or after a quick align was completed at the runway (using the above procedure).
It was also raining at the time of takeoff and dark. The control tower opens at 6am (because we are, after all, all about saving money) and only has one controller on duty at that time. He or she has to: run ground control, clearance delivery, approach control and departure control. The one controller also has to program the ATIS and make the coffee. He or she probably cleared comair to take off and then put their head back down to do a chore or work another airplane. Taking the runway, the comair guy would put the power up and wouldn't realize they were on the wrong runway until they were about 70% down the pike. Too late to safely abort so he probably decided to try and continue the takeoff.
No dispute there either. It should be noted that we still don't know what lights the crew noticed were inop. The NTSB reports that the crew made mention of lights being inoperative, but we don't know which ones or when they made the comment. At the time of the accident, the centerline lights on 4/22 were notamed out of service, so the comments could have just been normal commentary. Fact is, we don't know.
This is when the eye witnesses heard a series of explosions and thought the plane blew up in the air. Didn't happen -- what they heard and saw were compressor stalls of probably both engines. The pilot no doubt pushed the throttles all the way up and that demand to the engines combined with the steep pitch attitude cut off enough air to the intakes to cause the compressor stalls -- which, by the way, made them even more doomed.
I haven't heard any eyewitness reports to this extent, and statistically speaking eyewitnesses tend to blow things out of proportion. It's possible that they did hear "a series of explosions", but they could have just as well been part of the actual accident occuring.
As far as compressor stalls, I don't know how probable that actually is. There is nothing that indicates that the crew ever "pulled up" to the extent necessary to stall out the plane (that would have taken quite a deck angle at the slow airspeeds they were at). Furthermore, the way that the engines are designed make compressor stalls very irregular in the CRJ.
Less power. They stalled or simply hit one of the large hills to the west of the airport and came to a stop. Everybody on board was probably injured but alive. Then, a second or two later the post-crash fire began. With the darkness and the fact that most of them had broken legs, pelvises and backs they literally burned alive. Not smoke inhalation. They really actually burned to death. In my role as station liaison I wrote most of the post crash safety procedure for Delta at that field. Too bad there weren't enough survivors to use them.
There's no reason to write a perspective about how the passengers supposedly passed away. It's unprofessional and speculative. Medical examinations have shown that many of the passengers died from crash injuries according to what I last heard.
BTW, comair and the press will tell you what a great plane the RJ is. This is a total lie. The Canadair RJ was designed to be an executive barge, not an airliner. They were designed to fly about ten times a month, not ten times a day. They have a long history of mechanical design shortfalls. I've flown on it and have piloted it. It is a steaming, underpowered piece of **** It never had enough power to get out of its own way and this situation is exactly what everybody who flies it was afraid of.
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Must be an awful plane. Especially since there are more of them flying around the skies today (in 7 different variations), than many other airliners. I agree that the CRJ can be underpowered, but typically not on the takeoff roll. (In fact, many takeoffs are made at reduced power "flex" settings that intentionally "derate" takeoff power to reduce engine wear.)
I can't verify the poster/writers experience, but with more than 4000 hours in the aircraft (right and left seat), I can say that I doubt that performance issues were at play here. Even fully loaded on an ISA+15 day, the plane is capable of 3000 FPM plus climbs below 10,000.'
The senior member of the crew had about five and a half years of total jet experience. The copilot less. They had minimum training (to save money --enjoy that discount ticket!) and were flying a minimally equipped p.o.s. on very short rest.
The training that Comair pilots complete is on par with that of any other regional airline out there and certainly meets federal regulations. 5.5 years experience at a regional is more than many captains, and the FO wasn't wet behind the ears either. As for minimally equipped P.O.S, I'm curious to know exactly what that means since the airplane has FMS, GPS, Glass Cockpit with EFIS and dual AHRS systems. It's more advanced in avionics than many of the older Boeing fleet members out there (including older 737s, 757/767, and 747s)
The layover gets in about 10pm the night before. They report for pick-up at 4:30am.
This has already been disputed. The flying pilot actually had more than 24 hours in LEX, and none of the crewmembers were in LEX for less than 12 hours.
I'm sorry if I sound bitter but this is exactly the direction the entire airline industry is going. Expect to see bigger more colorful crashes in the future. email me if you need an off the record so-called expert. I have 20,000 hours of heavy jet flying time and am type rated in the 727, 757, 767, 777, DC-8, DC-9 and L-1011. <his email address was not included>
I notice that with the exception of the 777, he doesn't list any truly modern glass cockpit aircraft. (I'm sure that his experience flying the DC-9 makes him qualified to report on the CRJ... after all, it does look like a CRJ from a distance.) Further more, he doesn't mention how much experience he actually has in the CRJ. Seems more to me like he's trying to position himself for a high paid "expert witness" for the families that have filed lawsuits.
As far as I'm concerned, there certainly have been some major mistakes with this accident, and there certainly is justification for eventual legal proceedngs. However there's still a lot to be discovered and determined, particularly before we have a full understanding of what happened (unlike the "I know what happened" statements made by this "writer"). Until then, speculation and "expert-ism" (for lack of a better term) is extremely harmful to the proper investigative process.
~Josh
ATP, CL-65 Type Rating
4200 hrs in type (Atlantic Coast Airlines/Independence Air)