It’s sad to say this tragedy could have been avoided. The Colgan knew of the pilot’s substandard performance in training and checking. When I say Colgan, I mean the instructors, check airmen, Director of Training, Chief Pilot, and D/O. Under the regs, the FAA is also kept in the loop about check and training events, along with pass/fails.

With that being said, Colgan did him an injustice by upgrading him perhaps before he was actually ready for command. Reading the transcripts it also appears the F/O was way behind the aircraft and it’s systems possibly due to the nonchalant conversation and her fear of flying in icing conditions.

Winter operations alone is very demanding on one’s attention and experience. It’s unfortunate that carriers don’t require first officers, contemplating upgrade, to operate from a base for a full winter season and get real hands on experience. To quote Shakespeare “4,000 hours PIC in the south a winter pilot does not make.”

Airline training curricula merely require training in stall recognition , and not actual stall escape procedures. That’s a disgrace. I know… I know since we don’t intentionally perform stalls in the aircraft, why should we train stall recoveries in the simulator. Would training stalls have saved the crew? Would have experiencing the stick pull system in the simulator saved the crew? Nobody can answer that question.