Right. Low-cost upstarts like PeopleExpress, New York Air, Air Florida, etc. were grabbing a lot of customers using full-sized jets (RJs hardly existed then). Lorenzo was taking legacies down the same road. Crandall had a large hoard of cash and threatened to start his own low-cost subsidiary unless the APA agreed to a B-scale. It was a draconian 50% payscale cut for all new-hires, planned to last for their whole careers. In return, he promised rapid expansion, and that did happen. Other carriers won less drastic B-scales which slowly merged into full pay, so AMR's plan couldn't last long in its original form.

B-scales were like a "holy grail" for management: besides the money, there were executive egos and Wall Street perceptions in play. It became a "litmus test" of other CEO's ability to control costs, and avoid having Crandall call them wusses. Offers to provide equivalent savings via other means were rebuffed. One management official reportedly said "we won't hire without a B-scale, even if it's in the company's interest to do so."

At first, most new-hires were just happy to be off the street and on the seniority list. Quick upgrades kept up morale for a while too, but as many had predicted, the sight of others earning much more in the same seat eventually became unbearable. The B-scale had to go or internal war would have broken out, and even management feared collateral damage. They would have to cut pilot wages by some other means.....