Originally Posted by
NoStep
Some very interesting points here, and it's heartening to see this thread not turning into a p%#$ing contest.
There are always "gotcha's" out there like the EFIS CompMon being a nuisance message (i.e. at KLGA), except when it's not.
High speed aborts are likely to be more dangerous than taking the problem in the air...except when you make the quick determination she won't fly (i.e. TWA L-1011(?) at KJFK).
So, food for thought here. Another poster hinted at transferring controls during an abort to the Capt., which eats up valuable runway while the a/c accelerates and your making a positive transfer, eroding your options further. If the Capt. is the NFP, he's "inside", while the F/O's outside and on the controls. Although many reasons have been given for changing duties at this critical phase of flight (Captains authority, tiller on his side, the left seat makes you smarter
, etc.) it's one of those procedures that seems incongruous.
Not beating you up or arguing with you, but the the historical data shows it is extremely more dangerous (not likely) to high-speed abort than to continue into the air.
Heck, a major number of DC-10 hull losses (I think around 20) are attributed to pilots aborting at high-speeds for nusance problems or aborting past V1.
Here's a FAA finding on RTOs published back in 1990s...
More than half the RTO accidents and incidents reported in the past 30 years were initiated from a speed in excess of V1.
About one-third were reported as occurring on runways that were wet or contaminated with snow or ice.
Only slightly more than one-fourth of the accidents and incidents actually involved any loss of engine thrust.
Nearly one-fourth of the accidents and incidents were the result of wheel or tire failures.
Approximately 80 percent of the overrun events were potentially avoidable by following appropriate operational practices.