That Tomcat one does not count, that was a pure aircraft malfunction that was not related to the fact that it was a flyby. He could have been flying a straight low-level or been running cold after taking the Phoenix shot, and would have had the same results.

It is semantics and I don't want to debate the details, but 1,000' AGL is not always interpreted as 1,000' above the stadium (although 200' feet above the stadium would certainly be below the accepted standard). You are right, the tapes and FDRs give away all of the secrets.

Military leaders are often like water and electricity, they follow the path of least resistance. How's that?

The hard way (sts) - identify a dangerous pilot BEFORE they can cause damage or mission failure, such as during training. It takes real leadership to stand in front of the boss and say that this person should not be here, and it takes real leadership from the Wing CC/Commodore to be willing to face HHQ when they start getting calls from the lawyer. You are right to say that the Wing King is more likely to discount the testimony of the gradebook/IPs/CC if the student is saying the right things. The other hard way (sts) - defend a one-time mistake made by an otherwise good pilot and refuse to terminate his career to make an example. The immediate supervisors in this case should be commended for standing behind their guys after they made a mistake (vs committing a crime).

The easy way is what the RADM did - take some publicized event and drop the hammer, although there are many instances of less publicized instances where the hammer wasn't even considered. Take some one-time event where the pilot leaned forward a little too much (such as your generator story) and drop the hammer, even though everyone in the wardroom (including the skipper) knew of some other instance where an equivalent level of risk was taken by someone and there were no ramifications because nothing went wrong. As a matter of fact, that same skipper probably had an equally poor decision (considering ORM) in his past that he got away with.

It takes spine to invoke a lesser level of punishment on the public cases when everyone is looking for blood, such as was done in that Green Mountain incident that you talked about. It's called judgment.

I am not saying what they did was right. I am not saying that they were not incredibly ignorant in thinking that their flyover wouldn't get publicity. I am saying that their transgression is not to scale with the punishment that they got.

Someone decided to let two new E-3 pilots to fly together at night - that decision resulted in $100 million dollars in damage and nearly led to the loss of 32 crewmembers. Has that person faced any consequences? No, but why not? Their judgment was just as poor as the Hornet drivers. Their ORM considerations were even worse than those of the Hornet drivers.

Here's a sidenote, can a flyover at 1,000' be more dangerous than one at 500'? Absolutely! What if a wingman is behind the powercurve at 1,000' and is trying to get back in position as they are approaching the stadium? Isn't there a danger of a midair if he's got a vector into lead? Whether at 1,000', 2,000', or 5,000' - once the airplanes hit (if they hit hard enough), there is no controlling where they go. For every altitude, there is a specific location where, if the collision occurs, the resulting mass will fall into the stadium. Of all of the risk factors, altitude is only one and it is no greater a risk factor than most others.

Those 2 Hornets were in a stable (no closure) formation. There was no risk of midair. Their flight path was straight and level well prior to the stadium and they did not initiate a turn until well past the stadium. Even when the turn was initiated, it was away from the wingman and the wingman took additional spacing in the turn. Those 2 jets at 500' were far less of a risk to the people on the ground than 2 jets at 1,000' or even 2,000' would be if one of those jets had a vector into the other. Even at 1,000', a dual engine flameout due to bird ingestion results in the aircraft pretty much going on it's own path with little input available to the pilot - the Hornet without engines is closer to a brick than a glider. Unfortunately, our simple minded leadership can't recognize that. They can't seem to use judgment. They can't analyze the facts and recognize that only one or two (low altitude) risk factors are present, and those risk factors aren't even "high risk" factors. As a matter of fact, O'Hanlon went the opposite direction and declared that there were nearly tragic consequences: "Fryman failed to provide effective [crew resource management] for his flight lead and allowed an unsafe flyby to occur with nearly tragic consequences," Rear Adm. R.J. O'Hanlon wrote in documents obtained by Navy Times. "Despite his spotless record, his complacent, passive response to a major altitude transgression is unforgivable in my view." Really, nearly tragic consequences?

They were violations to regulation to be sure, but do we permanently ground those who violate regulation every time? It was a momentary lapse in judgment. The article notes that they fessed up after landing and the Admiral himself noted a previously spotless record and the fact that both officers were dedicated and motivated.

RADM O'Hanlon is a joke. I don't know enough about the guy or his history, but I am fairly confident that if I had a track record of his decisions, I could find some that were just as egregious or dangerous as this flyby was. Good job advancing the "one-mistake" Navy - always a healthy environment for a warfighting force.

I tend to agree with some of the comments found on related blogs such as:

RADM O'Hanlon. Where were you the last 15 years when Holly Graf was abusing crews as XO and CO of Naval surface combatants?,

The Navy is now run by people who think its purpose is not to fight as indicated by O'Hanlon's comments. They're going to suffer major defeats in the beginning of our next war until they are replaced by folks like Lt. Cmdr Fryman. It is unfortunate, but probable., and

As Navy reserve officer, I think you are spot on. The Navy has become risk averse.