Originally Posted by
ColdWhiskey
With that being said, I think it could have happened to many of us. They have paid a huge price.
Let us all learn from it.
Originally Posted by
ColdWhiskey
But most important I beleive is proper checklist discipline. I see too many people just read/or recite from memory the checklist, and say from memory the proper response, without actually verifying the checklist item.
It think it's more than checklist usage.
Part of CRM is effective communications which includes active listening. Both appeared to have missed something. The CA called for Flaps 20, but the FO set 8. For whatever reason, the word "Twenty" that entered his ear did not get processed correctly by the brain, and therefore the brain didn't tell the hand to more the switch a little more. The FO called that he had set Flaps 8, and the CA confirmed this. Neither processed what had been said vs what was supposed to have been said/done.
So here is my question: with the FAA all hot and bothered about runway incursions, why is this practice of completing so much "inside" work while the aircraft is moving an FAA-approved procedure?
16:09:02
HOT-2 takeoff data forty four thousand pounds. flaps eight twenty seven twenty eight thirty four seventy three eighty seven point eight set.
16:09:08
HOT-1 set.
16:09:08
HOT-2 flaps trims eight degrees green. seven point six.
16:09:12
HOT-1 eight green seven point six.
16:09:13
HOT-2 flight controls checked. navaids autotuned. thrust reversers armed. taxi checklist complete.
All of this is done while the ac is moving. The FO is inside with the ACARS and setting the PFD. The CA has to look inside to set the bugs and look at the speed card (to verify the correct weight is selected). This is where the flap setting should have been caught, twice. Seems like some of this could have been completed before the aircraft came off the gate.