This was emailed by TC of Block 5. Good reading.
Also, for those not aware, TC has just upgraded and gone to HKG. Although the FDA stuff in the TA would have benefited him, he chose to be 1 of 2 dissenting votes. Good leadership TC.
Ladies and Gentlemen of Seniority Block 5,
The FDX MEC Policy Manual describes an MEC communications protocol to which each member of the MEC voluntarily submits. Representatives are urged to submit written or website communications to the MEC Communications Department, after which the appropriate MEC staff, committees, and officers review the communications for factual content. The goal of this process is to ensure consistent and accurate communications to the membership. However, this protocol is not intended to unduly limit the elected representatives’ constitutional rights to communicate.
I submitted the following Block 5 Update according to the protocol, and I have incorporated many of the recommended changes. I am appreciative of the time and effort which was dedicated to improving the final draft. However, the MEC Vice Chairman has refused to publish this via our normal venues of communication, i.e., through e-mail and on the FDX ALPA website. While I do not expect him to share my opinions, I do not believe there is anything in this update which is factually incorrect. Having reached an impasse, and being entitled to communicate freely with you, I must regretfully resort to communicating to you without his blessing. I have tried to work within the protocol, but I will not be silenced, nor will I compromise my message to you.
This update will not be published on the FDX ALPA website—pilots of Block 5 will receive it at the e-mail address they have on file with ALPA, and pilots of Local Council 22 (Blocks 2, 5, and 7) will have access to it through the crewroom.alpa.org website in “My Mail” (http://fdx.alpa.org > Quick Links > My ALPA > Mail).
Ladies and Gentlemen of Seniority Block 5,
On February 9, 2011, I cast my vote on behalf of you and all pilots at FedEx Express on the very important question of whether to endorse the tentative agreement and begin the process of membership ratification, or to reject the TA and continue negotiating our collective bargaining agreement according to the procedures proscribed by Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act. I did not take the responsibility lightly, and I believe you deserve an explanation of why I cast a dissenting vote. I submit this narrative as an explanation of my perspective on the events leading to this vote, and how I came to cast that vote.
I apologize for the length of this update, as it is very long. I don’t want this to be the first in a volley of point/counterpoint messages. As the one and only statement on the subject, I want to make sure I have fully explained each point. I’ll apologize in advance if I fail in that goal, but I will not be publishing any further explanations, so as to avoid even the appearance of campaigning against the TA. I also apologize for the time which has transpired since the vote was cast, the time you’ve had to wait to hear my explanation. My schedule has been somewhat dominated by upgrade training, and I’ve been trying to not embarrass myself in that endeavor. In fact, I could have focused on training and assigned my proxy to another member of the MEC and avoided this vote, but I considered it far more important to ensure that you were adequately represented at the MEC table. I thank you for your indulgence and your patience.
BACKGROUND
Collective Bargaining under the Railway Labor Act
No sooner than the ink had dried on our current CBA, our union began gathering data and ideas in order to formulate goals and strategies for our next CBA. Your MEC held strategic planning retreats, sponsored polls conducted by the Wilson Center, hosted Web-based polls and surveys, solicited direct input from pilots to their block representatives, compiled input from committee chairmen, and added their own list of priorities for improvements. We examined those areas which give us the most grief through contract enforcement, discipline, and grievances. Based on the data which was gathered and our assessment of the political and economic environment, we established reasonable, achievable goals. We sought to achieve a limited number of improvements so we could complete the task in an abbreviated time frame. Nobody wanted to engage in a lengthy, protracted cycle of negotiations. Our Negotiating Committee did an outstanding job of condensing that data into realistic, achievable goals and developing a plan to achieve those goals. We communicated that plan in a document we called “Section 6 Openers,” we sent you a copy of that document along with a new ALPA lanyard, we asked you to wear the lanyard to support the Negotiating Committee, and we committed to strive towards those reasonable, achievable goals.
Since negotiations began in August of last year, progress has been made at a reasonably brisk pace. The Company chose to open some sections of the CBA which we had elected to not open, but four sections were not opened at all. To date, four of the sections we opened have been TA’d, and four of the sections the Company opened have been TA’d, bringing the total of TA’d sections to twelve. While there are important improvements (and in some cases, losses) in these sections, the areas covered in those sections do not typically affect the day-to-day life of the average line pilot.
Congress, the FAA, and Flight and Duty Time Rules
In the background of these negotiations, the FAA has been working on the formulation of new rules to address pilot flight time, rest, and fatigue. Following the crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407 in Buffalo, N.Y., on February 12, 2009, the issue of pilot fatigue gained the widespread attention of the public. Driven by the concerned families of the victims of that crash, Congress got involved and mandated changes. In July of 2009, the FAA convened an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to recommend a science-based approach to fatigue management. We were fortunate to have one of our pilots, Captain Bill Soer, on that ARC. FedEx management also had a member on the ARC. Between the two, we have a solid grasp of the range of rules proposed by the ARC to the FAA on September 1, 2009.
In November of 2009, the FAA formally withdrew the rules they had proposed in 1995 to address flight time and rest limits. A fear exists that this current NPRM process will become drawn-out like the previous one. But a significant difference between the 1995 NPRM and the current NPRM is that the timeline in this case is mandated by Congress. The 1995 NPRM received thousands of comments from the aviation industry, and, although there was much opposition, there was no consensus on what the rules should be. The result was inaction. Today, we have a consensus recommendation from labor, and a more mature body of fatigue science to support that recommendation. Based on the soundness of the recommendations and the attention of the public and lawmakers, I believe it is very likely that we will see new rules on the schedule mandated by federal law.
Nevertheless, a suggestion was made to the MEC that we “pause” negotiations of our CBA until the results of the FAA’s rulemaking process are published. The MEC rejected that strategy, and directed the Negotiating Committee to continue along the path we had laid out in our strategy to negotiate a CBA on an expedited timeline.
Foreign Duty Assignment Letter of Agreement
And yet, our “timeline” for negotiating was substantially altered last fall when the Company wanted to devote a considerable amount of time and energy to negotiating a Foreign Duty Assignment Letter of Agreement. The MEC approved the change in direction, and we sent a team to study working and living conditions in Cologne and Frankfurt, Germany. Negotiations focused on modifying and improving the benefits provided in the “original” FDA LOA, and concluded with the creation of a “new” FDA LOA. (This is the FDA LOA contained in the January 27 tentative agreement.) The Company was eager to submit this FDA LOA to the membership for ratification. Your MEC, sensitive to the ratification environment, felt that submitting that LOA to the membership for ratification would have been a waste of resources (Road Shows and BallotPoint cost dues money) and that such a vote would not have been a unifying event for this pilot group. The Negotiating Committee suggested that the Company add something to the FDA LOA which would have mass appeal, such as an across-the-board pay raise. The Company rejected that idea, saying there could be no pay raise outside of a full CBA.
Exploring a New Strategy
Given that ultimatum, and a fear that the flight and duty time rules would make negotiating impossible, the MEC officers directed the Negotiating Committee to explore the possibility of “packaging” the FDA LOA as an “interim” contract, or a contract “extension” which could include a pay raise to make it more palatable to the membership. As it turned out, while the Company was unwilling to include a pay raise in an LOA, they were willing to include a pay raise in a CBA, which will end RLA Section 6 negotiations. Such was the genesis of the TA in your hands now. In addition to the FDA LOA, the previously TA’d sections of the CBA, a modest pay increase, a small lump sum, several LOAs and MOUs, and two administrative grievance settlements are included in the package.
That is my view of how we got to the point where the MEC was asked to endorse or reject this TA. In answering that question, I gave consideration to the final CBA we seek to achieve, how this TA might affect the ultimate value of that CBA and the time it will take us to achieve it, and whether this TA is in and of itself worth the risk of extending our timeline or diminishing the quality and value of the final product.
THE TENTATIVE AGREEMENT
Sections 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 30
Before I explain my view of the strategy and the future, allow me to give you my assessment of the TA itself. First, there are twelve sections of the CBA upon which ALPA and the Company had already reached tentative agreement. Four were sections we chose to open, four were sections the company chose to open, and four were sections we both agreed to not open. (Sections 10 [Management Pilots], 16 [Worker’s Compensation], 17 [Prisoner of War], and 30 [ALPA-PAC] were not opened, and are not included in the “printed” TA.) By plan, these sections were chosen first because we didn’t anticipate they would involve difficult negotiations or any economic impact. While there are substantial and meaningful improvements, there aren’t many issues involved which, in my opinion, affect the day-to-day lives of most pilots. With regards to requiring a pilot to provide “a written statement from the pilot’s physician,” replacing the vague wording “in conjunction with” with the specific wording “within 24 hours” is a win for us. Removing the $50 penalty for not using the Company-issued credit card to pay for an annual or semiannual FAA medical examination is a win for us. (Waiting three years to have the amount increased another $25 is a hollow win for us.) The creation of an ALPA Safety and Data Collection Bank for flight pay loss associated with critically important safety programs is a big win for us. Lengthening the duration of the probation period for newly hired pilots is a loss for us, with no offset.
Sections 3 (Compensation), 5 (Traveling Expenses), and 31 (Effect on Prior Agreements, Effective Date and Duration) are included to add dollars and make this a tentative agreement, but they were not part of the original twelve sections. If this TA is ratified, these three sections will be reopened and negotiated in any future RLA negotiations, but the 12 TA’d sections will remain closed, unless unforeseen circumstances dictate otherwise.
Iraq and Afghanistan Flying LOA
Now let me discuss the “other” LOAs and MOUs which are bundled into this deal. Over two years ago, before the Company invoked §4.A.2.b. of the CBA, we had finished work on the Iraq and Afghanistan Flying LOA. This LOA closely resembles the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) LOA currently in effect, as the flying is very similar in type and risk. The problem we had encountered was that the CRAF LOA would not be triggered unless the CRAF was activated. So, while pilots were flying into an “increased threat area,” an airport within a country either in or geographically contiguous to a country against which the United States is actively engaged in a military confrontation, they did not qualify for the benefits or protections provided by the CRAF LOA. While I am not happy about the strained method of defining the areas which qualify, and am less happy about the mechanism for removing or adding countries to the list of countries covered, I support the overall concept and the Iraq and Afghanistan Flying LOA as a whole.
ICAO “Over/Under 60” LOA
At that same time, we had also completed work on an LOA to address the problems encountered by our over-age-60 pilots, both Captains and First Officers, who may not both occupy the cockpit when flying internationally. The only mechanism the Company has to deal with scheduling conflicts after such pilots are awarded the same trip is substitution. Many of our pilots try to avoid being scheduled together, but sometimes it is unavoidable. This LOA provides a much more comprehensive solution to the problem, and, in my opinion, represents a big improvement.
Safety Programs: ASAP, FOQA, and Data Collection
Years of work have gone into developing industry-leading safety programs, like the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and the Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) Program. We have fought long and hard to protect the pilots from discipline when they submit ASAP reports, and to ensure that FOQA data is de-identified by ALPA Gatekeepers before it is entered into that program. Additionally, a Collection of Human Performance/Alertness Data Program was created to form the basis of a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS), which will be important for dealing with the anticipated results of the Flight and Duty Time NPRM, and with ultra long-range flying anticipated in our future. All three of these programs are huge wins for the pilots.
Administrative Grievance 10-02 (Pilot In Command on Augmented Crews): Settlement Agreement
Wrapped together with the TA’d CBA sections, the MOUs, and the LOAs are two grievance settlements. The first, Administrative Grievance 10-02, deals with the designation of PIC when two captains happen to be crewed together, and for some reason, the Captain captain with the highest system seniority is not the pilot in command. Although the affected pilots suffered no economic harm, they will receive an economic reward in the form of hours credited to their compensatory makeup banks, which allows them to pick a trip and receive compensation at 150 percent of the normal pay rate. The method agreed to for determining PIC is essentially the same as that which is published in the latest version of our Flight Operations Manual (FOM).
Administrative Grievances 09-02 and 09-04 (Invocation and Implementation of §4.A.2.b.): Settlement Agreement
The second grievance settlement in the package is for Administrative Grievances 09-02 and 09-04, the Invocation and Implementation of CBA Section 4.A.2.b. I’m sure you’ll recall that the arbitrator in these grievances rendered a decision on most aspects of these grievances in May 2010. The arbitrator also maintained jurisdiction over a limited aspect of the grievance, and encouraged the parties to work together to achieve a solution. At that time, our attorneys told the MEC, and the MEC told you, that we considered the arbitrator’s decision to be a “split decision.” We told you we would be evaluating the months we spent in §4.A.2.b. with the objective of determining an appropriate “buy-up value” which would affect the pilots whose BLGs had been most adversely affected by the systemwide spreads in BLGs. We committed to examine those months which had been presented to the arbitrator (who we felt had used incorrect assumptions in evaluating those months), and those months which had not been presented to the arbitrator, as we had remained in §4.A.2.b. even after our case had been fully presented to the arbitrator.
Although the MEC told you we would seek an economic remedy for those pilots who were most harmed by the greatest disparities between the highest and the lowest bid line guarantees, we never proposed such a remedy to the company. This settlement seeks no such remedy. This settlement agreement puts no restriction on entry into §4.A.2.b. This settlement agreement establishes no minimum on the value of a day of reserve, and no minimum on the value of a day of instructing. It only addresses one of the aspects of the grievance left unsettled by the arbitrator, that is the spread between high and low BLGs. It offers no remedy to the pilots who were most harmed by the implementation of §4.A.2.b. To be fair, I must point out that some of those questions fall outside of the narrow scope of the Administrative Grievance and the specific areas left by the arbitrator for the parties to discuss. Those aspects will have to be negotiated through the normal RLA Section 6 process when we get to Sections 4 (Minimum Guarantees and Other Pay Provisions) and 24 (Furlough and Recall) of our CBA. However, this settlement agreement closes the door on ever receiving any economic compensation as remedy for the unfair spreads between bid line guarantees when we languished under §4.A.2.b.
This settlement agreement resembles the Administrative Grievance 09-03 (PSIT Expulsion) settlement agreement in some respects—it employs the systemwide average metric concept, and a buy-up value provision. The subtle differences are important to note. First, while there is an upper limit of sorts on the high BLG—no more than 13 CH (17 CH in a five-week bid period) greater than the lowest paid regular line—there is no lower limit on the low BLGs for the secondary lines. Similarly, there is an upper limit on 95 percent of the lines—no more than 16 CH (20CH in a five-week bid period) greater than the lowest paid regular line, yet there is no lower limit for the secondary lines. Also, for 5 percent of the lines, there is no upper limit whatsoever on BLG.
Beginning the first day of the January 2012 bid period, secondary lines that are not constructed solely with reserve days will also be included in the calculation of the systemwide average metric. While including secondary lines in the calculation could conceivably bring the SAM up and hasten exit from §4.A.2.b., it could also drag the SAM down and have the opposite effect. The values of secondary lines could be artificially depressed by increasing the number of secondary lines and reducing the number of reserve lines. Secondary lines constructed solely with reserve days are not included, but nothing would prevent the Company from building secondary lines with one trip and 14 reserve days. Building secondary lines with one out-and-back and the remainder of reserve days would drag the SAM down, further delaying exit from §4.A.2.b.
To make matters worse, crew positions with fewer than 100 active pilots (Hong Kong and Los Angeles fit that description today, maybe Cologne tomorrow?) are excluded from the line construction limitations forever. And to add unspeakable insult to heinous injury, the company felt it necessary to craft language, excluding the B-777 fleet from the calculations, which contemplates the possibility of invoking §4.A.2.b. during the upcoming year!
continued.....