10

The PF advised BAH-C that due to the smoke in the flight deck, the ability to view the cockpit instruments, the Flight Management System (FMS), Audio Control Panel (ACP) and radio frequency selection displays had been compromised.

At 15:21 UTC, the PF advised BAH-C that they would stay on the BAH-C frequency as it was not possible to see the radios. The PF elected to remain on the BAH-C radio frequency for the duration of the flight.

At approximately 15:22 UTC the aircraft entered the Emirates FIR heading east, tracking direct to the DXB RW12L intermediate approach fix. The aircraft was now out of effective VHF radio range with BAH-C. In order for the crew to communicate with BAH-C, Bahrain advised transiting aircraft that they would act as a communication relay between BAH-C and the emergency aircraft 10 .

At 15:22 UTC, the F/O informed the relay aircraft that he was ‘looking for some oxygen'. During this time, UAE-C transmitted to the A/C on the guard frequency 121.5. The PF did not transmit an acknowledgement on the guard frequency but did transmit on 121.5 at a later point. The relay aircraft confirmed to UAE-C that the emergency aircraft was transmitting on the BAH-C frequency.

Following the rapid descent to 10,000 ft the aircraft leveled off at the assigned altitude approximately 84NM from DXB.

At approximately 15:26 UTC, the PF requested immediate vectors to the nearest airport and advised he would need radar guidance due to difficulty viewing the instruments.

At around 15:33 UTC, approximately 26 NM from DXB, the aircraft descended to 9000 ft, followed by a further gradual descent as the aircraft approached DXB, inbound for RW12L. The speed of the aircraft was approximately 340 kts.

APPROACH TO DUBAI AND OVER FLIGHT OF DXB RW 12L

15:38 UTC, approximately 10NM from RW12L, BAH-C, through the relay aircraft, advised the crew the aircraft was too high and too fast and requested the PF to perform a 360° turn if able. The PF responded ‘Negative'.

At this time the DFDR data indicated the gear lever was selected down, the speed brake lever moved toward extend and at approximately the same time there was a sound consistent with the flap handle movement; shortly afterward the PF indicated that the landing gear was not functioning.

The aircraft over flew the DXB northern airport boundary on a heading of 117°, the aircraft speed and altitude, based on the radar plots and DFDR information, was 340 kts at an altitude of 4500 ft and descending.

Following the over flight of DXB, on passing the south eastern end of RW12L, the aircraft was cleared direct to Sharjah Airport (SHJ) as an immediate alternate – SHJ was to the aircraft's left and the SHJ runway was a parallel vector. The relay pilot asked the PF if it was possible to perform a left hand turn. The PF responded requesting the heading to SHJ.

SHARJAH ALTERNATE/RIGHT HAND DESCENDING TURN

The PF was advised that SHJ was at 095° from the current position at 10 NM and that this left hand turn would position the aircraft on final approach for SHJ (RW30).

The PF acknowledged the heading change for SHJ. The PF selected 195° degrees on the Mode Control Panel (MCP), The AP disconnected at 15:40 UTC, the aircraft then entered a descending right hand turn at an altitude of 4000 ft as the speed gradually reduced to 240 kts until the impact.