Their website carries no word of the accident but rather the following amazing statment:

Quote

With our extensive experience and unblemished safety record, we at Global Exec Aviation are proud to provide the integrity, safety, value, and quality sought by today's charter clientele and owners.

Endquote

You'll find it at Global Exec Aviation

Wow ...

TransMach

I don't know how the civilians figure mishaps rates but two items come to mind here.
One - until the **FINAL** release of the investigation is out......nothing is certain except for the unfortunate outcome
Second - at least in the military.....absolution from a Class A mishap can be granted under certain circumstances.

I had the same thought as you when I walked down one squadron's passageway and saw a recent 50,000 Mishap Free Flight Hours Safety plaque on their wall and knowing full well that they had had a Class A FM (flight Mishap) with loss of airplane and pilot

Of course the other possible answer is that they have an IT department that is little behind the 8-ball and hasn't gotten around to updating the website yet. The bosses have more pressing matters to attend to at this time.

USMCFLYR

I noticed that their IT department was quick enough to remove the Lear from the list of aircraft available for charter. ;)

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/10/22/317804/ntsb-finds-high-power-stowed-thrust-reverser-in-fatal-learjet-60.html This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On September 19, 2008, at about 11:53 p.m. EDT, a Learjet Model 60 (N999LJ) overran runway 11 while departing Columbia Metropolitan Airport (CAE), Columbia, South Carolina. The airplane had arrived about 40 minutes earlier to pick up the passengers, two popular musicians and their support staff, and proceed to Van Nuys, California. The flight was operated by Global Exec Aviation as a non-scheduled domestic passenger flight under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 135. Tire debris and portions of airplane components were found along the 8,600 foot runway. According to witnesses and initial information, the beginning of the takeoff roll appeared normal, then sparks were observed as the airplane traveled along the runway. At about 136 knots, the crew attempted to reject the takeoff, however they were unable to stop the airplane before exiting the runway. The airplane continued beyond the runway blast pad and through the approximately 1,000 foot runway safety area while striking airport lighting, navigation facilities, a perimeter fence and concrete marker posts. The airplane then crossed a roadway and came to rest where it struck an embankment on the far side of the road.

The 2 crewmembers and 2 of the 4 passengers were fatally injured, the other 2 passengers suffered serious injuries. The aircraft was destroyed by extensive post-crash fire. There was also damage to the airport lighting, a navigation antenna array; and perimeter fencing.

The accident captain held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with a Lear 60 type rating and had logged approximately 3,140 hours total flight time and approximately 35 hours in Lear 60 airplanes. The accident First Officer held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with a Lear 60 type rating and had logged approximately 8,200 hours total flight time and approximately 300 hours in Lear 60 airplanes.

The Learjet model 60 is a twin engine business jet with a nominal 8 passenger capacity. Records shows the date of manufacture for N999LJ was January 30, 2007. The airplane was purchased by the current owner on October 25, 2007 and the operator began to use the airplane for charter flights about six weeks before the accident. The airplane had logged less than 120 flight hours total. The airplane was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney Canada PW305A engines, rated at a maximum 4679 pounds of thrust.

A Special weather observation taken by the control tower at the time of the accident indicated the winds were from 060 degrees at 7 knots, visibility was 10 statute miles under clear skies, temperature 19 degrees Celsius, dewpoint 13 degrees Celsius, and the sea level barometric pressure was 30.23 inches of mercury.

Columbia Metropolitan Airport Runway 11/29 was 8601 feet in length and 150 feet in width with a grooved asphalt surface. The runway safety area was 1,000 feet in length and 500 feet in width. At the time of the accident, the intersecting runway (05/23) was 8,001 feet in length and 150 feet in width, and was closed due to construction.

The airplane came to rest along a southeasterly orientation, nose-up on the side of a hill of approximately 25-30 degree slope. With the exception of all three landing gear, right delta fin, and right wing flap, all major airplane assemblies were found in the expected orientations. The top and right side of the fuselage had burned away to about the level of the cabin floor. The aft fuselage was mostly consumed by fire as far aft as the localizer antenna on the vertical stabilizer.

The first piece of tire debris was observed about 2300 feet from the departure end of runway 11. Numerous other piece of tire debris were located along the runway. Prior to the first piece of tire, five small pieces of broken taxiway reflector adhesive were found. Tire and skid marks could be followed on the runway and were spaced 100 inches apart (8’ 4”) consistent with the spacing between the centers of the inboard left and outboard right wheels. Before reaching about 3400 foot of remaining runway, the left and right main gear tire rims scarred the runway surface.

The marks led past the runway and through four rows of gravel at the bases of the instrument landing system antenna components. Approximately 150 feet past the end of the pavement, near the first set of lights, the main landing gear pistons and wheel sets with the brake assemblies were found. The right main landing gear (squat) micro-switch was found on the grass near the main landing gear with short pieces of wire remaining. The left squat switch was also found on the grass, but with no wires.

The wheel sets were found with very little rubber other than tire beads attached. Grinding and friction damage was evident on all wheel and brake assemblies, with the most severe damage on the right outboard, and diminishing somewhat across to the left outboard. The right outboard wheel halves had the edges of both bead flanges ground completely away. The tire beads were missing. The general bottom features of the brake assembly were ground flat and the bottom of the ground area of the assembly exhibited heat-bluing. The hydraulic lines had extensive damage.

Preliminary examination of the right PW305A engine revealed that the accident exposed inlet guide vanes (IGV) and reference to a manufacturer’s chart showed the orientations were consistent with high power. The thrust reversers were in the retracted/stowed orientations.

The main cabin door was found closed and latched. The aft exit and fuselage area was destroyed by fire, however, the exit handle and one pin-type latch were found in debris. Both were in the open or unlatched position. One of the surviving passengers reported no difficulty opening the exit.

The operator, Global Exec Aviation, was established in 2002, in Long Beach, CA. GEA provides jet management and on-demand charter services. The company has approximately 20 employees including 11 pilots, and operated 9 airplanes including Gulfstreams, and a Falcon 50, Citation 650 and the Lear. GEA had no prior accidents recorded in the NTSB database.

Two thoughts......is 136 kts less than V1 for this type and conditions and was the Capt. (experience) the PF?

RIP :(

Withut pulling out my book, 136 would have been close to V1, Vr around 143.

Should have gone.

RIP

Is this the sort of thing that using balanced field length can prevent...? Doesn't V1 vary somewhat for every takeoff and loading condition, and does the calculated V1 take into account remaining runway?

From NTSB report: "The accident captain held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with a Lear 60 type rating and had logged approximately 3,140 hours total flight time and approximately 35 hours in Lear 60 airplanes. The accident First Officer held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with a Lear 60 type rating and had logged approximately 8,200 hours total flight time and approximately 300 hours in Lear 60 airplanes."

Perhaps this is a dumb question, and I certainly mean no disrespect to those who have passed. Why was the person with so much less experience the captain? According to this NTSB report, the FO had more than twice the total time and more than 8 times as many hours in type as the captain. Would someone with that much experience elect to NOT be captain? I know guys do that in the major airlines because they like their seniority and schedule, but would anyone do that at a 135 or fractional?

[/I]Perhaps this is a dumb question, and I certainly mean no disrespect to those who have passed. Why was the person with so much less experience the captain? According to this NTSB report, the FO had more than twice the total time and more than 8 times as many hours in type as the captain. Would someone with that much experience elect to NOT be captain? I know guys do that in the major airlines because they like their seniority and schedule, but would anyone do that at a 135 or fractional?[/QUOTE]

Yes, the 35hrs in type, especially in this type as the apparent designated "captain", troubles me. Now, the swaping of seats per leg is an industry standard. However, this SOP for air carrier/CFR 135 operator would be at the discretion of the Chief pilot/ops-spec and insurance requirements.(typically 50 in type for LR60)
The Guy in the right seat could have still been designated as the pilot in command. Filed flight plan/dispatch records might give a clue on this.

In any case, IF the first sign of trouble the crew was aware of was at 136kts.... then yes, they should have gone flying... and maybe they tried.

More analysis and info to come on this one I'm sure.

later

Recent news account indicate that the aircraft was owned by Goodyear. Got to figure this to be inaccurate. Shocked that a news group could get info wrong.

Did anyone pickup on the IGV's in high power position? Did someone forget to reduce power on the abort? Over my career I've seen a lot of mistakes in the sim and not reducing the trust levels to idle would be on that list.

whatever the case may be the lawsuits are already starting to pile in Barker seems to be the first one on board

Most of the reports out there state that Goodyear Tire/Rubber (referencing the tires on the Lear) is named in the lawsuit.

From AINAlerts 11/25/2008....
 

[QUOTE=VmoMmo;506090]Most of the reports out there state that Goodyear Tire/Rubber (referencing the tires on the Lear) is named in the lawsuit.[/QUOTE

Victims File Lawsuit in S.C. Learjet Accident
By Matt Thurber....AIN Alerts or AINonline.com/accidents

November 25, 2008
Accidents


Travis Barker and Thelma Martin Still have filed a lawsuit in the California Superior Court following the September 19 overrun crash in Columbia, S.C., of a Learjet 60 operated by Global Exec Aviation of Long Beach, Calif. Four people were killed in the accident, including Thelma’s son, Charles Monroe Still Jr.; Chris Baker; and pilots Sarah Lemmon and James Bland.

The lawsuit alleges that Clay Lacy Aviation of Van Nuys, Calif., brokered the flight. Defendants in the lawsuit are Global Exec Aviation, Clay Lacy Aviation, Inter Travel and Services (ITS, owner of the Learjet), Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Bombardier and up to 100 defendants still to be named.

The lawsuit alleges that “as the pilots of the accident aircraft approached V1 speed they became aware of one or more of the tires having failed. Rather than proceed to takeoff, they negligently decided to abort and/or reject the takeoff.

The Learjet, the lawsuit alleges, was “unreasonably dangerous” because of defective design and other problems.

Like that one. :)

Not familiar with the 60 model, but is it possible to accelerate the engines using the T/R piggybacks without them actually deploying (ie...not armed or a mechanical)? Not uncommon in other makes and models and by reading the investigation, has me wondering.

Boy I hope they lose this one, what a bunch of idiots over 100 defendents, pathetic, It was an accident period, and its sad and tragic that people will take advantage of these situations. To bad the airplane was not full of trial lawyers.

Gotta love our wonderful "justice" system and those greasy ambulance chaser attorneys. Everyone wants to put blame on anyone but themselves - just to squeeze a little more money out. It's all about greed, not about making sure this tragedy doesn't happen again.
I agree with lear 31 pilot, "To bad the airplane was not full of trial lawyers."

Really Clay Lacey because they booked the flight? come on, are they just finding anyone with people with deep pockets?

NTSB Press Release from April 6/2010.


NTSB determined today - N999LJ - crash was because of operator's inadequate maintenance of the airplane's tires and the decision by the Captain to attempt a high-speed rejected takeoff, which went against operating procedures and training.

NTSB - further reading re-N999LJ

Very sad. They even sued the airport. Quite unsettling shooting approaches and flying over the accident site a day or so later.