Are we next?
 

ULCC business model is officially broken. I guess it’s time to address the elephant in the room. Are we next?

maybe.
maybe not.

outlook unclear.
check back at the end of your career.

for now let’s be helpful to those who are actually suffering rather than playing head games of what ifs.

I’m not saying it’s all candy canes and unicorn farts over here at F9. But, spirit had one too many problems simultaneously.

Chugging along like this forever isn’t a strategy, but “next” is not what I think is going to happen.

This isn’t really accurate — Frontier is not in the same risk category.

Frontier is structurally in a stronger position than Spirit for a few simple reasons:

• Lower CASM, period. Frontier consistently runs one of the lowest cost structures in the industry. When margins get tight, the lowest-cost operator survives — that’s Aviation 101.
• Better balance sheet discipline. Frontier didn’t load up on the same level of debt and financial commitments Spirit did, especially tied to growth and failed merger fallout.
• More flexible network. Frontier’s point-to-point, leisure-heavy model lets them cut or shift flying quickly without being tied to complex hubs or international commitments.
• Cleaner execution of the ULCC model. Frontier leaned harder into the true ULCC structure (high-density config, ancillaries, cost control), while Spirit drifted slightly higher cost over time.
• Less exposure to disruption risk. Spirit’s operational and financial volatility has been higher — Frontier has been more stable operationally, which matters more than people think in downturns.

The ULCC model isn’t dead — it punishes whoever loses cost discipline first. Right now, that hasn’t been Frontier.

It’ll likely depend on the overall profit/solvency of Indigo.

A few more more:

• Economic tailwinds. Only major direct competitor now gone in the ULCC space. This matters a lot for Frontier around its network and secondarily for JetBlue in FLL.
• More explicitly on CASM, more A320/1neos. The per passenger fuel hit wasn't quite as bad for Frontier as for Spirit, especially with the highest-density fleet and new-technology engines.
• Open space for up-charging. The ULCC standard is now Frontier, so Frontier can price as Frontier chooses.

Sorry if this is too soon, my heart goes out to all those who lost jobs. But I see this as a different, forward-looking industry discussion...

This is NOT correct. There are still market constraints besides Spirit.

Of course, didn't mean there weren't. Meant that there is no significant direct comparison.

If your evidence is NK, you'll need to try again.

Frontier and Spirit may have been somewhat similar airlines, however our balance sheets and ownership are completely different.

We are not anywhere near Spirit's position. We are actually very far from it. Even if we keep slowly losing money quarterly, we have little to no debt and have very close to 1B in liquidity.