Max display setup
 

For those of you flying the 737 max, how do you arrange the screens at your airline? At Alaska there is no specific requirement but it seems the engine instruments are displayed on the Capt as side and the larger NAV screen is on the FOs side. I’ve heard there are some airlines that want the PM to have one or the other, meaning the screens get switched from side to side depending on who is PF and who is PM. And do you expand the engine instruments or leave them in a compact form?

just curious.

Whatever the Captain decides they want.

Engine stack is on the Cptn’s side but I tend to think that it should be on the PF’s side so I always ask the FOs what they’d like. They inevitably say something to the extent of “whatever”, “I don’t care”, “doesn’t matter”.

Required to be on the Captain’s side for engine start…(?) but then you can put it wherever PF chooses while in flight.

Yep, been told by most CA’s “whatever you want.” I also try to display the hydraulic info for the parking check but usually forget. My biggest pet peeve with the displays is the disappearing flight number.

My biggest pet peeve is that it has the ability to display CPDLC and digital ATIS in the block below the flight number but our airline doesn't pay for it. :-(

What do you want next, a printer? Kids these days.

Hey they added the fuel totalizer!!! What more do you want!? Besides the basics.

True. Huge win. Now if they’d just turn it on on the -700s…

Too busy taking out printers and removing shades...

Yea right? You can tell Boeing really didn't care, it's obvious whoever did the software specs and testing had little or no actual commercial flying experience. Just like continuing to hide or upsell the AOA gauges until the crashes... I get the whole deal about trying to avoid a specific type rating, but I thought we were over the whole "oooh AOA gauge scary!" thing a solid 20 yrs ago. Even primary flight trainers get AOA gauges now and in spite of decades of dire warnings from the dinosaurs out there, nobody is spinning into the ground staring at the scary confusing AOA gauge. I remember the debates raging over AOA gauges back in the 1980s, with pilots ranting about downwind turns and the hazard of "retraining" pilots to correlate AOA with aircraft performance... Clearly Boeing never got the memo and that disappearing flight number is proof positive that they don't really have anyone with actual *flying* experience in there. Fine, don't change the software. Just give me back the little rotary number wheel on the yoke and I'll be happy. Nothing sparks a late night last-leg cussing session like turning off the runway and proudly transmitting "Ground, Southwest uhhhhmumbleg*&@mmi^ clear of the active for gate A4".

Naw, we're gonna be parking/selling the -700s and replacing them with MAX8 even if the MAX7 never shows up. Maybe retrofit the 3-number dials on the yoke to the MAX when the 700s start showing up at the chop shops...

What’s the hold up on the MAX 7? “Certification issues” is really vague but seems strange considering the MAX 8 has to be one of the most scrutinized aircraft in history. FAA finally putting their foot down on the 1960’s recall system?

Someone in another forum posted up something about a little snippet of legislation that changes the certification criteria starting in 2023, requiring a completely new alerting system. So if the FAA can manage to drag their feet on the max7 (and max10) certification until past the end of the year (Fiscal year if I recall correctly, so October), Boeing has to certify it as a new aircraft under new rules due to retrofitting them with the new alerting system.

Here's a little article discussing some of the problem: https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/...erting-system/

My bet is that someone is trying to kill SWA and/or force Boeing to get rid of the max. Like the rest of our government, there is probably someone with a huge pile of money behind all this pushing to require the MAX cockpit and workflow to be completely redesigned.

While I'm 100% in favor of killing off the 737, this is not the right way to do it. My preference would be to do it through airspace management efficiency/modernization requirements that can't be complied with using obsolete aircraft, or through market forces. Not by moving the goalposts in this way right at the end of the re-certification process of an existing aircraft that has had a pretty darn good safety record in the US for the last couple of decades, but which suffered a huge political hit due to crashes by barely qualified crews and slipshod maintenance outside the US.

I’m down for it lol. **** Boeing.

This is not the Boeing of old. This monstrosity with the name ‘Boeing’ pasted on its forehead can die in a fire.

When this rule was made, they made the effective date such that the MAX 7/10 certification would be done and it would therefore not apply to any of the MAX family. But then there were more delays than anticipated, and here we are. My guess is they get an extension since the spirit/timing of the rule was to enable all the MAX family to have the same eicas-less cockpit.

This all day.

The certification was supposed to be done already. They will either get it done at the 11th hour or they will get an extension. This isn't designed to kill the max, it's designed to protect it.

That's great, except for the congresscritters who seem intent on forcing the new alerting system into the max7 and max10. Congresscritters don't push that hard on anything unless there's a big pile of money motivating them.

Boeing has proven time and time again that their pile of money and (therefore) stable of friends is bigger.

CA’s discretion. But I prefer to have them on my side (FO) for engine start then switch them over if he/she wants them. Some always do, some would rather have the big nav display while flying.

Agree about congress.

However, EICAS should have been on the NG never mind the max. The moving goalposts was Boeing not putting it in the 737 in the NG 20 years ago when every single other similar sized airplane (redesign) had that. Accusing the FAA of dragging their feet is laughable after B building the same cockpit for 42 years.

Market forces should dictate products on the market. Exactly how many 737s have crashed in the last 30 years due to not having EICAS? In the last 20? Last 10? What's the compelling reason to kill off a profitable product line for an American company? I agree that Boeing had a lot to answer for and to correct with the MAX certification, but requiring a new feature to be added in the absence of a compelling safety vulnerability is a violent shift away from our free market economic practices that could have economic costs in in the Billions. You just can't do that without a compelling reason, unless you're a greedy congresscritter stuffing your pockets full because we're all too collectively stupid to demand term limits.

Libertarianism and Aviation Safety do not mix. I can think of 2 crashes in recent history that an EICAS would have come in handy.

For engine start and After Start Checklist, usually I have the FO display the engines on his side since he’s starting with the Hydraulic and Flight Control displayed on my side. After that, I prefer the engines on my side for takeoff even when I’m the PM since it’s my decision to reject or not. Once airborne, the FO as the PF can have the engines back on his side while I get the big map display back. Talking with my FOs it seems this is the way many captains do it.

I don't recall EICAS or lack thereof as being directly causal in any accidents.

But it certainly reduces distractions and simplifies handling abnormals and emergencies... that's the great value, frees up more bandwidth for flying the airplane. There's a reason all modern airplanes have it.

My classic vehicles don't have all of the safety features of our daily drivers. But I don't take the kids to school in freeway traffic in a rainstorm in the classics either. There's no need to perpetuate 1960's era technology and design practice in new-build airplanes.

How bout I just always leave it on your side.

EICAS/ECAM require that a pilot display basic airmanship and that the cockpit crew display basic CRM for a minute or two to put the aircraft on a safe/stable trajectory. Neither crew were able to do that. Had they been able to do that then EICAS/ECAM would have been a tremendous tool to help sort out the issue and accomplish a safe return. The 737 needs at least one experienced pilot with strong hand flying/raw data pilot skills and a thorough systems knowledge to be a safe airplane.

Part of the mishandling of the aircraft was due to confusion and lack of information. They simply did not know that the aircraft was trying to kill them.
Clacker and stick shaker at the same time. And nothing to indicate that anything was wrong with the aircraft.

Imagine how valuable an AOA FAULT caution message would be. Or a MCAS ACTIVE advisory message. Instead they were trying to read the 737 tea leaves while the aircraft hurled itself into the ground.

EICAS would have given those crews a chance. The 737 MAX has the largest screens of any narrowbody, and no room for EICAS. The airplane is a joke.

The trim wheel cranking nose down isn’t a tea leaf. EICAS didn’t help Air France. Basic aircraft control problems for both.

If they brought the damn thrust levers back they would have likely survived. My opinion only.

Let’s not forget that Asiana cartwheeled a 777 at SFO. “Experienced” aviators and EICAS in day VMC, and the airplane wasn’t trying to kill them.

Helios 522 comes to mind.

I'm not sure why EICAS would play a factor on Asiana, since there was nothing mechanically wrong with that aircraft.

The 737 MAX crashes were the result of a broken aircraft, and in both cases, the crews had no idea what was wrong. EICAS could have changed that.

I believe Ethiopian had a bulletin put out on MCAS, and the captain flew the aircraft fine through the malfunction. The un/under trained FO could not get through the checklist so the captain transferred the controls and ran it himself. The FO commanded nose up trim six times, which was effective, and then gave up and prayed aloud

Eicas would not fix that. The captain correctly ID’ed the problem. The FO was ab initio, and I believe they got him his sim time “creatively”

My point is that plenty of times pilots have flown non-broken aircraft into the ground. Airmanship was definitely a very large factor in the MAX crashes. Don’t forget, another crew had experienced the failure and successfully landed before.

Regardless of your opinion of the pilots, answer this question:

Are you still going to argue that an EICAS has no benefit?

I didn’t say it has no benefit. Don’t tell me what my argument is and then use that against me!

Could an EICAS alert have helped? I guess? Sure. Why not an “MCAS!!” audible?

Runaway trim response?

Could pulling back the thrust levers have helped?

My argument is that a 250 hour total time FO (total time within like a one year time span) would likely still have been a negative factor in the outcome.

Airmanship is not automatic. It’s a skill that must be learned, practiced, and honed—EICAS or not.

I agree. It takes several links in the chain to create an accident.

The aircraft malfunctions. The lack of annunciations. The lack of systems monitoring. The lack of ways to cancel erroneous warnings. Pilot experience and poor airmanship.

The majority of the holes in the cheese are on the aircraft side the equation. I'm hopeful that the EICAS exemption does expire. The more holes plugged, the better.

Not if you have so little skill and ability that basic stuff like airspeed control are beyond your ability without automation. I flew a full approach with stick shaker/clacker and ground prox warnings in a 737…in the weather. At the end of a long etops flight with no other options. I by no means am at all a top gun. Just used basic flying skills and all was well….I agree that the 737 Max is a joke. It in no way is a competitor to the A321NEO. The 737 all variants require someone on the flight deck with good basic flying skill or the airplane is unsafe. Period…..Boeings philosophy has always been to let the customer worry about the skill or lack there of on the flight deck. Millions cheaper to have human ECAM than to design and engineer it into the airplane.

Don’t worry Purdue you’re guna learn all about the Max here in the next year, I honestly think you’ll like the 737 once you get settled in.

Nope. Every crash is one too many. Market forces made Boeing use MCAS in a way it wasn't designed for, and that directly led to 2 crashes, and market forces did not ground the fleet afterwards. Boeing put EICAS in the 757 30 years ago, hardly a "new feature". It would be a lot cheaper not to install TCAS or EGPWS in aircraft (well, until the crash at least). All those things were mandated by aviation authorities based on the probability of thing going wrong, not because of corrupt elected officials.
They should have put it in decades ago, procrastinated in the name of profit, and are finally held accountable for that.