The idea of the big wigs is that the USAF doesn’t really do CAS in future conflicts. Whether or not that’s correct is up for debate, especially since recent conflicts have a funny way of including a lot of CAS.

However, plenty of aircraft do CAS other than the A-10. F-35, F-16, F-15E, MQ-9, even B-1s. Nothing as good as the A-10 in most cases. IF CAS is required, my guess is that the USAF relies on those assets and others.

But as stated above, CAS is a low priority mission set when it comes to planning for future conflicts.

 

I really appriecate the response.

 

The USAF doesn't prioritize CAS as much as USA/USMC would like. IMO this is one of those niches where the Army probably should have been allowed to retain FW combat aircraft, but the USAF is jealous of their hard-earned union scope. They don't want to do it, but they don't want to let anyone else encroach either. Dog in the manger frankly. This is a gap in one of our joint seams.

Yes the USMC could operate A-10's, and that appeared to have almost happened the first time the USAF tried to get rid of them. Didn't happen to due to budget and also the land-based aspect IIRC. A-10's could have been designed for carrier ops with minimal tweaks, but they weren't and that's not something you can fix later.

From the perspective of a former groundpounder and FAC, who *really* relied on CAS nothing in the inventory can fully replace the A-10, and USAF is just fine with that.

The reality is that the A-10 is probably on borrowed time, and budgets don't allow for a modern, clean-sheet "A" only replacement. The letter "F" pretty subsumes the "A" in this day and age. We'll just have to live with that most likely.

Especially since the obvious peer conflict of this century is a naval and air-intensive fight on and over the high seas. Putin couldn't make it past the Dnepr, much less anywhere near the Rhine.

 

Which makes the decline of the defense industrial base supporting the Navy, the decline of Navy surface fleet sustainability, and the disastrous engineering and tech maturity mistakes accepted by Congress for Navy procurement all that much more important. The only thing more alarming than the Navy's recent procurement debacles (Zumwalt Class DDGs (a "class of only three ships because they became too damn expensive to buy? The whole LCS debacle, the HUGE maintenance backlog affecting even those ships that actually can get to sea) https://news.usni.org/2024/05/07/gao...diness-concern )

and given the small number of Navy ships and the fact their commanders are supposed to be the best and brightest, we certainly seem to be relieving a lot of them for some reason:

https://taskandpurpose.com/news/navy...relieved-2023/

 

That was post-cold war fallout. A generation of leaders had to do *something* to re-engineer the structure and operating philosophy of the Navy, and that was a bit outside of their wheel-house (pun intended). There was uncertainty as to who the opposition was, GWOT was a distraction, it was unclear what direction PRC would head, and RU seemed downright friendly friendly for a while (until vlad needed external bogeymen for all the usual reasons).

Zumwalt was like the F-22 and SSN-21... cold war super-weapons which were no longer affordable. But in all three cases the technology developed was rolled into less costly versions which could be procured in quantity. Well the surface navy is still hashing that out but I think they'll get there now that the priority opponent and the mission are crystal clear.

In addition to the usual organic DOD dysfunction, you also have to allow for the injection of massive pork into the process.


It's always been that way (as long as I've been paying attention which is about four decades), and always surprised me that they relieve so many. My gut feel is that it's such a long and hard (and nerve-wracking) road to command at sea that some CO's are bit warped in their outlook by the time they get there. I knew one such, although he was warped all along and just managed to hide it long enough to get command (which lasted exactly four months). I've also know many great CO's... recall the Navy has many hundreds of command-at-sea jobs and even more ashore.

Also there's always been a consistent base-line of reliefs for operational reasons, which almost always amounts to hitting something with the ship. That's just the nature of naval warfare, and they try to encourage CO's to avoid such expensive evolutions by relieving those who do as a matter of course.

The recent uptick seems to be on the personal behavior front... DUI, affairs, being mean to the new generation of sensitive JO's, verbal harrassment, etc. That's why I think the issue is more of an emotional/personality one.

Oh well, at least the system seems to catch them on the back end so that's good.

 

The USAF’s primary concern in future, near-peer conflict (ie the worst case scenario short of a nuke exchange) is winning the Counterair fight. Counterland missions like CAS and Interdiction don’t happen unless you can gain and maintain some semblance of air superiority (at least locally and temporarily). I’m not saying that CAS isn’t an important mission or that the USAF shouldn’t invest in it, but it doesn’t mean much if you can’t dominate your primary reason for existing (fly, fight, and win the air domain anywhere on the planet).

The Hawg is an amazing jet and the absolute best at what it does. Its downfall is that it’s a one-trick pony. The same can be said about the Eagle and the Raptor honestly, both of which have had to adapt over time to fill more niche’s. Sad to see the A-10 go, but it’s time. I’d personally like to see the Army field a new, modern attack helicopter to replace the Apache before the Air Force thinks about investing in a new, dedicated CAS platform again. My two cents 🍻

 

Interesting points but the Army once again turned off the spigot when they Cnxl'd the FARA. Interesting times indeed.
There needs to be a new 'Howze Board', imho.

 

USAF of course has their parochial interests. But they're also doctrinally responsible for providing the joint enterprise with support from the air domain, and CAS is one of those. Fair to say they've been striving for a Gentlemen's C- on that.

But counterair will reasonably be more important than CAS in the obvious PRC scenarios. Unless things go horribly wrong and really drag out...

 

Well, they are rebuilding the North Airfield at Tinian. Guam and Tinian are a lot more unsinkable than a CVN. And Tinian is experienced at launching nuclear strikes if it comes to that, albeit it's been 80 years.

 

How much cheaper is a Block 70 Viper or Super Hornet compared to a 15EX or F35?

Yeah 5th gen are the bees knees, but quantity has its own quality...especially if involved in a CAS mission.

I don't see Fat Amy doing anything for troops in contact other than dropping JDAMs from above 10k.